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REFRAMING “PROFESSIONALISM”: AN INTEGRAL VIEW 
OF LAWYERING’S LOFTY IDEALS† 
ABSTRACT 
Whereas legal ethics defines what every lawyer must do, legal 
professionalism takes on the more difficult task of defining the core values that 
the very best lawyers should aspire to in their practice. The legal profession is 
granted a certain amount of autonomy and independence by American society, 
and the continuing legitimacy of this social contract depends on the notion that 
the profession will take care to regulate itself and maintain standards of 
conduct commensurate with its essential function. In the past several decades, 
however, an increasing number of judges, lawyers, and professors have opined 
that the legal profession is facing a “professionalism crisis,” arguing that 
civility has declined and that the public image of the profession has fallen into 
disrepute. Many have called for a renewed emphasis on defining and 
upholding the profession’s foundational principles, but few have been able to 
agree on what those principles actually are. 
In an effort to add some theoretical clarity to this discussion, this Comment 
will utilize an abstract framework provided by an emerging discipline known 
as Integral Theory. It will evaluate the professionalism “crisis” based on four 
fundamental perspectives—the interior and exterior of individuals and 
collectives—and then situate some of the current approaches to 
professionalism within these dimensions. This method is useful because it 
provides a set of stable and universal perspectives with which to engage the 
dynamic and often-fragmented academic literature on this topic in a coherent 
and comprehensive way. It helps to reveal the strengths of some models while 
also providing insight into how they can be expanded. While this Comment will 
not attempt to provide any final answers to this ongoing debate, it will 
hopefully contribute to it nonetheless by enabling divergent approaches to find 
some common theoretical ground. Ultimately, it will be argued that no final 
solution to the professionalism “problem” is likely ever to be found, and 
instead, professionalism should be conceptualized as an ongoing process of 
self-evaluation and development that is inherent to the practice of law. 
 
 † This Comment received the 2011 Myron Penn Laughlin Award for Excellence in Legal Research and 
Writing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, professionalism has come to occupy a controversial and 
somewhat ambiguous place within the legal profession. Unlike ethics codes, 
which establish minimum rules of conduct for practicing members of the bar, 
professionalism aims considerably higher in seeking to embody those “lofty 
standards”1 and “aspirational principles”2 that represent the very best of what 
lawyers have to offer. Complicating matters significantly is the fact that most 
professionalism theories go beyond merely advocating for certain types of 
behavior and venture instead into the murky waters of intention, motivation, 
and morality. Yet in attempting to define a set of normative principles that 
should inform and give rise to behavior from the inside—professional behavior 
that is self-motivated, undertaken for its own sake, and seen as its own reward, 
rather than behavior that is compelled or imposed from without by external 
 
 1 Thomas E. Richard, Professionalism: What Rules Do We Play By?, 30 S.U. L. REV. 15, 18 (2002). 
 2 Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism,” 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 422 
(1992). 
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rules followed primarily out of a fear of punishment for noncompliance—the 
professionalism debate has often suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity. 
Indeed, while the topic has garnered much attention in the past few decades,3 
there has nonetheless been relatively little consensus as to what 
professionalism actually entails.4 
This is not surprising. Professional values are subject to myriad 
interpretations dependent upon the particular moral, philosophical, cultural, 
social, historical, and political worldviews of the person seeking to define 
them. As such, the diversity of opinions on the nature and scope of lawyers’ 
highest values has expanded in the past century to reflect the increasing 
diversity within the legal profession itself.5 These demographic changes, in 
addition to broader changes in the overall business of law and the emergence 
of postmodernism in American culture, have combined to make the task of 
defining professionalism today much more challenging than it has been in the 
 
 3 See Dane S. Ciolino, Redefining Professionalism as Seeking, 49 LOY. L. REV. 229, 230 (2003) (“[T]he 
profession has waged a multi-frontal crusade to improve professionalism in the practice of law. In addition to 
forming innumerable committees, the organized bar has conducted symposia, adopted civility creeds, offered 
continuing legal education programs, and called upon American law schools to teach professionalism to law 
students.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 4 Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an Ethical 
Professional Identity, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 470, 480 (2008) (“[L]egal scholars have so far been unable to 
construct and agree on a widely-accepted, clear and succinct definition of ‘professionalism.’”). One 
commentator has even opined that, amidst all the talk about professionalism, “[n]o term in the legal lexicon 
has been more abused.” Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1303, 1307 (1995). 
 5 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 408–13 (describing the bar’s “changing ‘tradition’” and the 
“breakdown of the ‘club’” as the profession has ceased to be dominated by wealthy, white males). 
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past.6 Given that many of these changes are irreversible, a general consensus 
on the meaning of professionalism may very well be unreachable today.7 
The Sisyphean nature of the task notwithstanding, however, the pursuit of 
professional ideals is a noble one. Lawyers are afforded a certain degree of 
autonomy in American society, but such independence comes with an equal 
degree of responsibility for members of the profession to ensure that it serves 
its purpose well.8 For this “social contract” to function, then, “[t]he public must 
trust that the profession will renew the social contract in each generation . . . by 
socializing each new entrant into the important elements of an ethical 
professional identity.”9 These elements represent “a set of essential, timeless 
principles that impose important restraints and create special expectations 
separating the attorney from others,”10 and it is only through adherence to these 
principles that lawyering becomes something more than an ordinary career. To 
wit, it becomes a profession.11 
 
 6 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at 
Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 305, 310 (2000) 
(arguing that in rejecting “[e]lite status,” postmodernism “recognized that moral thought is based on pre-
rational assumptions that emerge from communities, and that those assumptions can vary from community to 
community,” and thus, “[p]ostmodern nihilism left no place for a common social agenda”). Indeed, the very 
concept of normative shared values itself has been attacked and deconstructed by some postmodern academics 
who see it as a vehicle for domination and class discrimination. See, e.g., Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism 
as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 663–64 (1994) (objecting to the 
idea of a set of shared values within the legal profession as “the privileged minority’s desire to avoid 
confronting directly the economic difficulties and moral ambiguities of rendering essential legal services in a 
capitalistic society where the majority of people are poor, working class, and middle class,” and criticizing 
professionalism codes seeking to enforce certain standards of behavior as being the “skewed perceptions of a 
privileged few” that “express flawed values, promote a false community, and constitute potentially dangerous 
exercises of hierarchical power”). 
 7 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 406 (“[T]hese principles have proven very difficult for us to 
identify. The debate is a deep one: we disagree not only about what the essential elements of a professional 
tradition might be, but also whether any such elements exist at all.”). 
 8 Id. at 423 (“[T]his independence has come with a price. The lawyer’s professional latitude, because it 
is justified by the importance of the law rather than the importance of lawyers themselves, is granted by 
society in exchange for the implicit promise by lawyers that their autonomy will be used to enhance the social 
function of the law.”). Underscoring the almost-sacred nature of this social compact, Terrell and Wildman thus 
argue that “[this] promise is the true essence and foundation of the concept of professionalism.” Id. 
 9 Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF. LAW., no. 4, 2008, at 4, 5. Hamilton 
observes that “[h]igh degrees of professionalism build confidence in the social contract. Failures of 
professionalism undermine the social contract.” Id. 
 10 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 406. 
 11 As famously defined by Roscoe Pound, a “profession” consists of “a group . . . pursuing a learned art 
as a common calling in the spirit of public service—no less a public service because it may incidentally be a 
means of livelihood. Pursuit of the learned art in the spirit of a public service is the primary purpose.” ROSCOE 
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). Pound’s formulation was noted with 
approval by the ABA’s Commission on Professionalism. See COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
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In an attempt to add structure to the debate and to help resolve some of the 
tensions apparent in the academic literature, this Comment will utilize an 
orienting framework provided by an emerging discipline known as Integral 
Theory. The Integral framework is a unique map that combines observations 
from numerous academic fields into a coherent system for analyzing complex 
issues. By utilizing a multidisciplinary approach based on four fundamental 
perspectives—the interior and exterior of the individual and the collective—the 
Integral model enables a view of any subject from all sides, thereby helping to 
honor, include, and yet transcend any particular theoretical angle to gain a 
broader appreciation of the whole. The primary strength of the Integral model 
is its ability to simultaneously handle both interior and exterior approaches 
without reducing one to the other.12 It can then further distinguish these two 
perspectives by differentiating between the individual and communal 
dimensions. It has been said that “the concept of professionalism has become 
confused and disjointed because it has been diagnosed too hastily,”13 and that 
“lawyers have sought a cure for a disease before agreeing on its nature, 
symptoms, and causes.”14 As such, Integral Theory offers a novel approach to 
fitting any given “diagnosis” of this “disease” onto a single theoretical map. 
Similarly, it allows for various proposed “cures” to be organized and evaluated 
for their relative strengths as well as the areas where they might be expanded 
to include additional dimensions. 
This Comment will proceed in four parts. Part I will present an overview of 
the Integral model to set the stage for reframing the topic at hand. In Part II, 
the Integral framework will be used to “diagnose” the professionalism problem 
in four dimensions, paying particular attention to the historical context from 
which the current “crisis” emerged. Part III will then proceed to evaluate some 
of the existing approaches to professionalism and orient their values within the 
Integral framework. Finally, Part IV will offer some conclusions on what 
lessons can be learned from this approach and advocate for the view that 
professionalism is best conceptualized as a process, not a destination. This 
conception makes clear the value of establishing a stable meta-perspective, 
 
“. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 
10 (1986) [hereinafter ABA, BLUEPRINT]. 
 12 For example, reducing professional values to the singular goal of encouraging civil behavior (i.e., 
reducing interior values to exterior behavior). Conversely, professionalism might be viewed solely as an 
adherence to certain moral principles, such as the obligation to provide pro bono work irrespective of one’s 
actual expertise in the area of assistance (i.e., reducing exterior ability to interior moral considerations). 
 13 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 404. 
 14 Id. at 403. 
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such as the one offered by the Integral model, to create a static framework 
within which the development of professionalism can be understood. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INTEGRAL THEORY 
In a nutshell, Integral Theory is a framework for dealing with complexity 
wherever it is to be found.15 It was originally conceived more than thirty years 
ago in the pioneering work of Ken Wilber, through his relatively modest 
attempt to synthesize the full history of the world’s knowledge traditions.16 
Although Integral Theory draws upon the abstract world of metaphysics, it is 
fundamentally an empirical approach to reality, and as such the Integral model 
has found its way into a wide variety of practical applications in recent years.17 
 
 15 See Sean Esbjörn-Hargens, An Overview of Integral Theory: An All-Inclusive Framework for the 21st 
Century, INTEGRAL INST., 1 (Mar. 2009), http://integrallife.com/files/Integral_Theory_3-2-2009.pdf (noting 
that Integral Theory is “suitable to virtually any context and can be used at any scale” because “it organizes all 
existing approaches to and disciplines of analysis and action, and it allows a practitioner to select the most 
relevant and important tools, techniques, and insights”). 
 16 In a recent work, Wilber explained his approach in this way: 
During the last 30 years, we have witnessed a historical first: all of the world’s cultures are now 
available to us. In the past, if you were born, say, a Chinese, you likely spent your entire life in 
one culture, often in one province, sometimes in one house, living and loving and dying on one 
small plot of land. But today, not only are people geographically mobile, but we can study, and 
have studied, virtually every known culture on the planet. In the global village, all cultures are 
exposed to each other. 
Knowledge itself is now global. This means that, also for the first time, the sum total of 
human knowledge is available to us—the knowledge, experience, wisdom, and reflection of all 
major human civilizations—premodern, modern, and postmodern—are open to study by anyone. 
What if we took literally everything that all the various cultures have to tell us about human 
potential—about spiritual growth, psychological growth, social growth—and put it all on the 
table? What if we attempted to find the critically essential keys to human growth, based on the 
sum total of human knowledge now open to us? What if we attempted, based on extensive cross-
cultural study, to use all of the world’s great traditions to create a composite map, a 
comprehensive map, an all-inclusive or integral map that included the best elements from all of 
them? 
KEN WILBER, INTEGRAL SPIRITUALITY 1 (2006). 
 17 Esbjörn-Hargens, supra note 15, at 2 (“[I]ntegral theory is being used successfully in a wide range of 
contexts such as the intimate setting of one-on-one psychotherapy as well as in the United Nations ‘Leadership 
for Results’ program, which is a global response to HIV/AIDS used in over 30 countries.”). A brief scan of the 
academic journal dedicated to the study and application of Integral Theory also reveals applications in such 
areas as ecology, religion, leadership, coaching, business, politics, education, medicine, and more. See The 
Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, INTEGRAL INST., http://aqaljournal.integralinstitute.org (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2011). In addition, the Integral Research Center was recently established to support and catalogue the 
growing use of Integral Theory in real-world applications through grant funding and institutional support. See 
Supporting the Global Community of Integral Scholar-Practitioners, INTEGRAL RES. CENTER, http://www. 
integralresearchcenter.org (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
SUTTLE GALLEYSFINAL 11/1/2011 1:11 PM 
2011] REFRAMING “PROFESSIONALISM” 167 
Like Einstein’s famous formula, E = mc2, the Integral model can be 
described as an elegant theory in that it captures and conveys an enormous 
amount of observation and insight in a surprisingly simple form (the “four 
quadrants”). Also like the theory of relativity, however, this simplicity of 
presentation hides a sophisticated and powerful approach to comprehending 
the world. Indeed, a full exposition of the Integral model is neither necessary 
nor feasible here,18 and what follows instead is meant only as an overview of 
the broad contours of the theory. As a warning, the explanation that follows 
may seem at times to be more than a little distant from the concept of 
professionalism, but it is important to grasp the underlying theory behind the 
Integral model before applying it to the problem at hand.19 
A. The Four Quadrants 
The four quadrants are the foundation of the Integral framework. They 
represent the “system of perspectives or stances that can be taken up, including 
first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives.”20 Reflecting on 
these three perspectives, one can see that they represent two broad, but 
fundamental, divisions that exist within the world. The first is that between the 
“subjective” (i.e., interior) and “objective” (i.e., exterior) dimensions. The 
second is that between the categories of “individual” and “collective” 
phenomena. When these perspectives are laid out in two dimensions, then, a 
simple four-part box emerges depicting the interiors and exteriors of 
individuals and collectives. 
  
 
 18 Wilber himself has written over two dozen books, which have been translated into around thirty 
languages, providing some idea of the breadth and scope of his work. Writings, KENWILBER.COM, 
http://www.kenwilber.com/professional/writings/index.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). This is in addition to 
countless articles, symposia, and other contributions from scholars working in the field, as well as a three-year, 
fully-accredited Master’s degree program in Integral Theory recently established at John F. Kennedy 
University in San Francisco. See Master of Arts in Integral Theory, JOHN F. KENNEDY U., http://www.jfku. 
edu/Programs-and-Courses/College-of-Graduate-Professional-Studies/Integral-Studies/Programs/MA-Integral-
Theory.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 19 The Integral model contains five foundational elements—quadrants, levels, lines, states, and types. 
WILBER, supra note 16, at 2. However, to limit what could otherwise become an overly ambitious and lengthy 
discussion, only the first three will be utilized for the purposes of this Comment. 
 20 Zachary Stein & Katie Heikkinen, On Operationalizing Aspects of Altitude: An Introduction to the 
Lectical Assessment System for Integral Researchers, J. INTEGRAL THEORY & PRAC., Spring 2008, at 105, 107. 
As the authors note, these three perspectives are so fundamental to human experience that they are implicit in 
the basic pronouns used in every language—“I” (first person), “we/you” (second person), and “it” (third 
person). Id. 
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Figure 1: The Four Quadrants21 
These four perspectives comprise the four irreducible worlds of experience. 
Any issue, event, or phenomenon that occurs is thus knowable only by virtue 
of these perspectives and can be mapped out accordingly in all four quadrants. 
Moreover, because the quadrants represent ways of viewing the world, the 
quadrants themselves are content free and can be applied to virtually any 
discipline or endeavor. 
Each of the four quadrants discloses a distinct approach to, and perspective 
on, experience. The UL includes all the interior, individual elements described 
in the psychological literature—including, in part, one’s emotional 
experiences, thinking processes, moral values, phenomenological perceptions, 
and so on.22 These are the invisible, qualitative aspects of the human 
experience that can only be known from the inside, like what you see when 
you imagine the color blue. By contrast, the UR includes all the exterior, 
observable, and quantifiable aspects of that same experience that can be seen 
through empirical observation, like the wavelength pattern that corresponds 
with blue in the visible spectrum or the neuronal patterns that fire when you 
look at the midday sky.23 UR perspectives describe the physical/biological 
correlates of interior phenomena, such as physical characteristics and behavior, 
 
 21 Esbjörn-Hargens, supra note 15, at 3, 6. 
 22 Id. at 3–7. 
 23 Id. at 4–5. 
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genetic inheritance, neuronal networks, heart rate, and so on.24 Both views are 
valid ways of approaching a single phenomenon, but each one discloses a 
different aspect of the whole.25 
In the collective dimensions, the LL represents the interpersonal or 
intersubjective domain—relationships between individuals, shared values, and 
cultural contexts—as disclosed by disciplines such as cultural anthropology, 
hermeneutics, or simple conversation.26 Methodologies addressing this 
quadrant capture the ways that a phrase like “to be blue” has a common 
meaning within our culture wholly distinct from its literal definition as either a 
visual perception or a wavelength measured by a machine. Finally, the LR 
encompasses the exterior forms that LL phenomena take on when they 
manifest in the physical world—patterns of collective interaction within vast 
social27 and economic systems, technological networks that connect people and 
things to one another, and indeed the legal system itself.28 To continue with our 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 See 6 KEN WILBER, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
KEN WILBER 1, 141 (2d ed. 2000) (“[I]t’s not that one is right and the other wrong; it’s that both are extremely 
important.”). To further illustrate these two dimensions, consider a phenomenon that is surely familiar to 
anyone who has ever taken a law school exam—the concept of anxiety. To fully describe such a phenomenon, 
it is necessary to distinguish its interior and exterior components. In the UL dimension, the student’s 
experience usually manifests as an interior sensation of uncertainty, fear, restlessness, and clouded thinking. 
From a UR perspective, however, it is equally valid to define anxiety by its physical correlates, such as an 
increase in heart rate, respiration, and perspiration accompanied by physical jitters, furtive glances, and an 
excessive amount of adrenaline flooding the brain. While both descriptions are true, they are each nonetheless 
partial in and of themselves. 
 26 WILBER, supra note 16, at 22–23, 25. 
 27 Although the terms cultural and social are often used interchangeably, in Integral Theory they each 
have a distinct meaning. The former refers to LL interior aspects of collective groups, while the latter refers 
specifically to the LR quadrant. See 7 KEN WILBER, A Brief History of Everything, in THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF KEN WILBER 45, 122–23 (2000). 
 28 Strictly speaking, the law resides in the LR quadrant, at least to the extent that it is defined by statutes 
and constitutions. These represent concrete, written codifications of agreed-upon cultural values—the LR 
exterior forms of LL interior cultural norms—that can be passed down as precedent to succeeding generations. 
In the words of Justice Holmes, “The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral life. Its history is the 
history of the moral development of the race.” O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
459 (1897). 
This is not to say, however, that in practice other quadrants do not come into play. A strictly LR 
perspective on the law leads inevitably to the “myth of the judge-as-oracle,” William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, 
Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 5 (1988), or an impersonal, purely objective 
interpreter of an established legal code who decides cases wholly unaffected by personal (UL) and cultural 
(LL) influences. A more accurate indication of how the law really works might be found in the words of 
Justice Cardozo, as he described his own personal approach to judging: 
What is it that I do when I decide a case? . . . If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to 
follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for the 
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“colorful” example, the LR perspective reveals how shared cultural values in 
Durham, North Carolina, can show up in a stadium full of strangers who all 
have painted their faces blue.29 
It is essential to note, however, that while each dimension is in some sense 
distinct and independent, all four perspectives nonetheless coexist and co-arise 
(or, really, tetra-arise), and each exerts an influence upon all the others.30 
Developing moral values in the UL causes changes in UR behavior. 
Conversely, chemical antidepressants acting on the exterior UR structures of 
the brain can influence one’s interior mood in the UL. Collectively, new 
transportation networks in the LR dimensions of society (e.g., the Silk Road) 
can lead to a blending of once-distant cultures. At the same time, cultural 
revolutions in the LL can lead to changes in society’s exterior, written legal 
codes in the LR. Those legal codes, in turn, channel UR behavior in new ways, 
just as changing LL cultural contexts influence the UL values of individuals 
 
future? . . . At what point shall the quest [for logical consistency] be halted by some discrepant 
custom, by some consideration of the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of 
justice and morals? 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921). In what might, from an Integral 
perspective, be viewed as an acknowledgement of the all-quadrant nature of the law, Justice Cardozo thus 
rejected the prevailing myth that a judge’s personal values were irrelevant to the decision 
process, because a judge’s role was presumably limited to application of the existing law, a 
process governed by external, objective norms. Cardozo acknowledged that judges, like common 
mortals, cannot divorce themselves completely from their personal, subjective vision. Cardozo 
observed that judges undoubtedly possess “subconscious loyalties” to the groups “in which the 
accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a place.” 
Brennan, supra, at 4–5. More succinctly, Justice Cardozo seems to have captured this notion in perhaps its 
most eloquent formulation when he wrote that “[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do 
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.” CARDOZO, supra, at 168. 
 29 Consider again our anxious student sitting down for his first law school exam. To complete the picture 
disclosed by the UL and UR perspectives, we must also consider the collective dimensions. That is, the interior 
experience of anxiety by our student, correlating with exterior physiological symptoms, did not develop in a 
vacuum. Rather, his anxiety is embedded within an LL cultural context (e.g., parental pressure to succeed, a 
desire to “fit in” with his law school peers, a shared belief among large law firms that grades are a measure of 
potential for success, and so on). Indeed, the word anxiety itself derives meaning only from the shared interior 
understanding of English-speaking individuals (i.e., the understanding of what that particular sequence of 
sounds refers to, where the same sounds would have no referent for someone who does not know the 
language). In addition, the student’s anxiety might also be attributed to LR factors, such as time limitations on 
the exam, a strictly curved grading system, his laptop’s ability to properly interface with the school’s wireless 
network, and even unfortunate patterns in the city’s traffic system that may cause him to be late. 
 30 For example, excessive pressure to succeed in the LL (e.g., “you know your sister aced her first-year 
exams”) causes an increased feeling of anxiety in the UL, corresponding with adrenaline surges and insomnia 
in the UR, which, in turn, leads our student to miss his bus in the morning (i.e., a failure in the LR)—all adding 
up to a terrible exam performance. 
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living within them. Thus, while each quadrant can be viewed separately in 
abstraction, it is essential to understand that, in reality, they exist as a unified 
whole. 
To return to our primary topic, we can now begin to see how an Integral 
approach might be useful in dealing with a complex issue like professionalism 
simply by distinguishing between its manifestations in each of the four 
quadrants. Doing so allows us not only to get a better view of the problem 
itself but also to see which methodologies might be most appropriate for 
seeking solutions in their respective dimensions. This means recognizing that 
the professionalism problem implicates not only the UL interior values of 
individual lawyers and the UR behaviors they exhibit, but also the LL shared 
values of their practice group, their firm, the legal profession as a whole, and 
the collective value that society itself places on the law and those who serve as 
its agents. By considering all these dimensions, we can then get a better idea of 
how concrete changes in the LR dimension (e.g., intrafirm mentoring and 
training programs, interfirm professionalism associations, advertising 
campaigns, pro bono requirements, revised written professionalism standards, 
and the like) might help to foster professionalism in all four quadrants on both 
a micro and macro scale. 
B. Levels of Development 
The four quadrants represent a content-free framework through which the 
distinct, but interrelated, facets of a particular issue may be viewed. As such, 
however, the quadrants do not account for changes over time—what might be 
thought of as the historical context in which any given phenomenon is 
embedded. This is an essential component to understanding professionalism,31 
which has emerged from its own unique historical tradition that ultimately 
began in the religious orders of the Middle Ages.32 To describe this 
development over time, then, the Integral model utilizes the concept of 
“levels,” or “stages,” of development.33 
 
 31 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 408 (“[A]nalyzing the changes in the [legal] profession gives 
us an appropriate and very important historical perspective on the present struggle to define professionalism.”). 
 32 See Cochran, supra note 6, at 306–07 (“To be a professional was originally to profess something, a 
commitment to one’s religious order. Some of the religious orders developed expertise in special disciplines: 
divinity, law, and medicine. The term ‘professional’ came to describe those with special expertise in these 
areas.” (footnote omitted)). 
 33 WILBER, supra note 16, at 4–6. 
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An understanding of levels begins with the empirical observation that 
everything evolves in all four quadrants. For example, over the course of a 
lifetime (or a career), an individual continually learns new concepts through 
experience and then proceeds to combine these concepts into increasingly 
complex UL mental structures that are used to guide and interpret interaction 
with the world. In the UR dimension, this mental development correlates with 
physical development in the form of new neuronal networks, refined motor 
skills, more complex patterns of behavior, and the relatively predictable stages 
of development commonly known as aging.34 
On a collective scale, cultures evolve too, and in myriad ways. Human 
beings’ relationships with one another have changed through various cultural 
revolutions, as our collective understanding of concepts like freedom, equality, 
and justice has developed over time. Humankind’s relationship with the world 
at large has also been refined through philosophical, religious, and academic 
discourses that go back centuries, occasionally overturning universally 
accepted worldviews (e.g., the Copernican Revolution). 
Similarly, the LR history of humankind’s social evolution tells a story of 
emergence from primitive foraging societies, through horticultural and agrarian 
revolutions that brought with them the first feudal empires, through the 
Industrial Revolution that enabled the growth of modern nation-states, and now 
into an informational society with a corresponding emergence of a globally 
interconnected, transnational world.35 As a real-world example of how LR 
development takes place in the legal profession, the renewed emphasis on 
professionalism in the LL has given rise to global networks of individual law 
firms that share a high regard for excellence in their practices, such as the Lex 
Mundi project.36 The firms that take part in these associations are connected 
not only by mutually held values in the LL but also by LR networks that 
 
 34 Stepping back a bit further, one can observe the long-term evolution of physical systems themselves 
from single-celled to multicelled organisms, followed by development of the reptilian brain, limbic systems, 
the neocortex, and so on. See WILBER, supra note 27, at 119 fig.5-2. Each of these, in turn, correlates with 
emergent interior structures in the UL, from pre-conscious sensations to basic impulses to emotions to the 
capacity for symbolic mental constructions, which can then be combined into abstract concepts, and can then 
be operated upon and manipulated through rational thinking. Id. 
 35 See WILBER, supra note 27, at 26, 32. 
 36 See Timothy P. Terrell, Professionalism on an International Scale: The Lex Mundi Project to Identify 
the Fundamental Shared Values of Law Practice, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 469, 472 (2009) (describing the 
Lex Mundi project as an “ambitious effort by an association of law firms, whose members are drawn from the 
entire globe and have both international and domestic law practices, to develop, announce, and implement a set 
of shared fundamental professional values”). 
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channel resources and clients between them to give external support to their 
shared internal goals.37 
In addition to the observation that all things develop over time, another 
tenet of the Integral model is that development, in any of the quadrants, is not 
random but rather directional. Broadly speaking, structures and systems evolve 
through a predictable series of discrete stages from simpler forms toward 
increasing complexity and depth. Moreover, the higher, or more developed, 
structures do not simply supersede lower levels but transcend and include38 
them as constituent parts.39 To describe this phenomenon, “Arthur Koestler 
coined the term ‘holon’ to refer to an entity that is itself a whole and 
simultaneously a part of some other whole.”40 Thus, each discrete holon is 
itself a collection of parts, yet at the same time it is something more than their 
sum.41 Because each holon includes its predecessors, but not vice versa (i.e., 
cells contain molecules, but molecules do not contain cells), this development 
gives rise to an implicit hierarchy, or “holarchy,” of development.42 
While this pattern of development is relatively easy to recognize in the 
exterior dimensions (for example, atoms to molecules to cells, a single circuit 
to a microprocessor to a laptop computer, or a few houses to a village to a 
bustling metropolis), levels of holarchical development have been observed in 
the interior dimensions as well. Although LL cultural evolution is a fascinating 
subject, however, the UL individual–interior dimension is most relevant to the 
topic of professionalism. Specifically, the work of developmental 
psychologists such as Lawrence Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan, Robert Kegan, and 
many others has revealed that interior development proceeds hierarchically 
through levels of increasing complexity in much the same way as exterior 
 
 37 Id. at 472–76. 
 38 See WILBER, supra note 27, at 79. 
 39 In the UR, for example, atoms do not turn into molecules, which then turn into cells, and so on all the 
way up. Rather, each level both transcends the previous level while at the same time enfolding it within itself. 
A molecule is not simply a heap of atoms but a distinct structure of a higher order complexity, even though it 
is composed of lower level structures and is in that sense dependent upon them. Id. 
 40 Id. at 69. 
 41 An excellent example of this is the modern corporation, which is seen not merely as a collection of 
individual employees and managers, but as a distinct entity (or “person”) in and of itself (even possessing its 
own “personal” rights) that exists independently of its particular membership at any given time. See 1 U.S.C. 
§ 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise[,] . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations . . . as well as individuals . . . .”); see 
also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that corporations have a First Amendment 
right to fund independent broadcasts in political elections). 
 42 See 7 KEN WILBER, An Integral Theory of Consciousness, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF KEN 
WILBER, supra note 27, at 367, 373. 
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evolution does.43 While there is much disagreement as to how many of these 
stages there are, where particular levels begin or end, what labels they should 
be given, and how best to measure individual development, there are 
nonetheless some useful insights from these disciplines that have a direct 
bearing on the professionalism problem. 
C. Lines of Development 
 Integral researchers Zachary Stein and Katie Heikkinen at the Harvard 
Graduate School of Education describe lines this way: 
Lines are relatively independent forms of psychological 
functioning—reflecting both different ways of thinking and the 
different things we think about. . . . As Wilber’s extensive 
scholarship revealed, researchers have proposed upwards of a dozen 
distinct lines of development. Consider the differences between 
moral reasoning and reasoning about the physical world. It is easy to 
imagine, and research has confirmed, that someone advanced in their 
thinking about physics would not necessarily be advanced regarding 
issues of morality. These are distinct domains, different lines along 
which thought, action, and behavior develop.44 
Currently there are at least two dozen distinct lines that have found support 
in empirical research.45 These account for a wide spectrum of human ability 
and experience, including “ego strength,”46 moral development, self-identity, 
cognition, role taking, creativity, altruism, empathy and care, interpersonal 
relationship skills, emotional awareness, and kinesthetic skills, to name only a 
few.47 Because lines develop independently of one another, a person can be 
 
 43 KEN WILBER, INTEGRAL PSYCHOLOGY 29 (2000). Clearly, the idea of a hierarchy of mental structures, 
and in particular those related to moral values, can be a controversial proposal in today’s postmodern society. 
Nonetheless, the overwhelming evidence from developmental psychology supports the conclusion that there 
are at least some broad stages through which interior development evolves in a predictable, directional pattern. 
Id. Importantly, these conclusions are based on almost a century’s worth of empirical data, and not mere 
“theoretical speculations.” Id. at 29. For a discussion of Kohlberg’s six “objective and universal” stages of 
moral reasoning and the “invariant sequence” in which they develop, see Elliott M. Abramson, Puncturing the 
Myth of the Moral Intractability of Law Students: The Suggestiveness of the Work of Psychologist Lawrence 
Kohlberg for Ethical Training in Legal Education, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 223, 223–24 
(1993). 
 44 Stein & Heikkinen, supra note 20, at 109 (endnote omitted). 
 45 WILBER, supra note 43, at 28. 
 46 See Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of 
Solutions to Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality 
Attributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547, 565 (1998) (referencing “ego strength” as a potential determinant of 
a person’s ability to behave in accordance with their moral intentions). 
 47 WILBER, supra note 43, at 28; WILBER, supra note 16, at 58–59. 
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highly evolved in, say, the cognitive line, but express a lesser or even 
pathological degree of development in another line, such as moral reasoning or 
empathy.48 Lines thus expand the concept of levels described above by 
charting development in more detail.49 
However, it is important to remember that, in a practical sense, the 
boundaries dividing various levels and distinguishing between lines are far 
more diffuse than they might appear from a purely theoretical perspective.50 A 
person’s cognitive, interpersonal, emotional, or moral reasoning skills 
represent “mutually interacting patterns”51 that collectively influence overall 
behavior and awareness. Nonetheless, thinking of the personality in terms of 
distinct lines could be useful for diagnosing problems related to 
professionalism by zeroing in on the specific strengths or deficiencies of a 
particular individual. 
In the legal context, professionalism itself might be appropriately thought 
of as its own line of development existing alongside, but independent of, other 
abilities specific to the legal profession (e.g., logical reasoning, writing, and 
 
 48 This helps to explain why an individual’s overall development (i.e., the sum total of one’s 
development along various lines) often does not appear to proceed in a linear fashion, even though empirical 
evidence collected from many individuals supports the idea of sequential stages of development in a broad 
sense. WILBER, supra note 43, at 28. For example, while it might seem reasonable to assume that a generally 
intelligent and mature person would make intelligent, rational moral decisions, history has proven time and 
again that this is not always the case. Otherwise-mature, responsible adults can exhibit extremely irrational, 
immature, or even infantile behavior at times because of repressed or pathological development in a particular 
line. See WILBER, supra note 27, at 188 (discussing dissociation and repression in the context of Kohlberg’s 
stages of moral development); WILBER, supra note 43, at 91–98 (discussing pathologies that can occur at 
various stages of development). Importantly, however, “the bulk of research has continued to find that each 
developmental line itself tends to unfold in a sequential, holarchical fashion: higher stages in each line tend to 
build upon or incorporate the earlier stages, no stages can be skipped, and the stages emerge in an order that 
cannot be altered by environmental conditioning or social reinforcement.” WILBER, supra note 43, at 28–29. 
 49 As a loose analogy, levels might be thought of as a way to describe the broad differences in 
temperature, geology, vegetation, and animal life that are found at various altitudes on a mountain. Lines, then, 
would be more akin to different pathways that a climber of that mountain might take. Levels thus describe the 
overall characteristics of particular stages of development as measured along one or more lines, and therefore, 
“[a] ‘level of development’ is always a ‘level in a particular line.’” WILBER, supra note 16, at 61. 
 50 Id. (“[D]evelopmental lines are not really lines in any strict sense. At most, they represent probabilities 
of behavior—and thus are something like probability clouds more than ruler-straight lines.”). In terms of 
levels, the mountain analogy described above is also useful for emphasizing the fact that development is not 
rigid and ladder-like, with clear boundaries dividing one stage from the next. That is, changes in one’s 
surroundings occur gradually and are usually not apparent when one is actually climbing up the mountain. Yet 
there are undeniable differences between the environment at the peak and that found on the valley floor. 
 51 WILBER, supra note 43, at 31. 
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oratory skills).52 Doing so would help to emphasize the importance of teaching 
and developing professionalism explicitly alongside practical knowledge as a 
foundation of legal education. Those using this way of thinking about 
professionalism in the UL dimension would consider it more of a skill to be 
continually developed over the course of a career than as a type of content to 
be learned. That is, the substantive meaning of professionalism lies in the 
collective LL and LR dimensions, where individual behavior takes on 
significance and value in the context of relationships with other professionals 
and the legal system itself. The capacity to understand and appreciate this 
meaning, then, would be determined by one’s level of development in the 
professionalism line. 
This development could be measured in terms of cognitive ability, moral-
stage development, interpersonal skills, etc.,53 and broadly described as one’s 
adeptness at thinking about, relating to, and managing the inevitable moral and 
ethical conflicts that arise in legal practice. Focusing in on the moral and ego-
strength lines as a subset of professionalism could also help to assess one’s 
capacity to align UR behavior to actually reflect this interior understanding 
(i.e., one’s integrity, or the tendency to walk the walk rather than simply talk 
the talk).54 Obviously, there is much more to be said about this particular idea, 
but it is not necessary here to develop the concept fully. It will suffice instead 
to suggest that utilizing the lines concept could be a useful tool in both 
assessing and instilling professionalism in individual attorneys. 
II. AN INTEGRAL “DIAGNOSIS” OF THE PROFESSIONALISM PROBLEM 
A. Lower Quadrants: The Consequences of Cultural and Social Evolution 
Although the problems that seem to plague the legal profession today have 
distinct manifestations in the individual dimensions, many of these can be 
viewed as the result of certain large-scale changes in both the profession and 
American society as a whole. Some of these changes have been structural (i.e., 
in the LR quadrant), such as the increasing number of law schools, the impact 
of new technologies on the legal profession, and the changes in the business of 
legal practice. But to a large extent, the professionalism problem has been 
 
 52 More accurately, it could be considered as a particular grouping of several interrelated lines (cognitive, 
moral, interpersonal, ethical, and so on). 
 53 See Stein & Heikkinen, supra note 20, at 105 (using the Lectical Assessment System to measure 
development within any line). 
 54 See Daicoff, supra note 46, at 565; Hamilton, supra note 9, at 9–10. 
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argued to have primarily resulted from interior shifts in LL cultural values, 
such as the breakdown of a unified sense of “community” within a legal 
profession that is no longer the highly segregated and insulated “club” that it 
once was.55 Accordingly, this interior shift in values will be addressed first. 
Before looking at the current state of the legal profession, one should note 
that concerns about the integrity and public image of lawyers are nothing new. 
In 1895, The American Lawyer lamented that the bar “has allowed itself to 
lose . . . the lofty independence . . . [and] fine sense of professional dignity and 
honor” by becoming “increasingly contaminated with the spirit of 
commerce.”56 In 1929, Karl Llewellyn remarked that “it is clear that the 
activity of most skillful lawyers will be upon the side of the Haves and not 
upon the side of the Have-nots” and stated that he “do[es] not think the lawyer 
popular, and that his unpopularity appears . . . as natural as whiskers on a 
cat.”57 Yet despite the historical presence of these concerns, the perceived lack 
of professionalism among modern lawyers is often characterized as a “loss”58 
or “decline”59 in certain qualities and values that were once central to the 
practice of law. A persistent narrative has emerged that lawyers in the past 
were engaged in a more noble form of public service than the self-serving, 
greedy, win-at-all-costs style of practice that many argue is prevalent today.60 
This longing for the “good old days,”61 however, seems contrary to the 
notion that cultures, organizations, and people themselves evolve and develop 
 
 55 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 408–13. 
 56 The Commercializing of the Profession, 3 AM. LAW. 84, 84 (1895). 
 57 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND LAW SCHOOL 
160 (11th prtg. 2008). 
 58 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 4. 
 59 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 283 (1998); accord 
John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Responsibility and Implementing Change, 
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 563 (1994) (“[T]he public perception problems lawyers face today are deeper and 
more widespread than any the profession has ever faced before.”); Warren E. Burger, The Decline of 
Professionalism, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1993) (“[T]he standing of the legal profession is at its lowest ebb in 
the history of our country . . . .”); Daicoff, supra note 46, at 552 (citing the results of a 1993 ABA poll 
reporting a “majority view . . . that, compared to lawyers in the past, today’s attorney is less caring and 
compassionate”); Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The ‘z’ Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The 
Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 551−52 (2002) (discussing the loss of 
professionalism as a result of “Rambo tactics” justified as “zealous” representation, which “continue to harm 
the legal profession and denigrate its once positive image to the public”). 
 60 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 4 (citing “[a]rguments by generations of lawyers who graduated prior to the 
1980s that ethics were higher and lawyer conduct more civil earlier in their careers”). 
 61 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 405. The authors distinguish between what might be called 
“healthy” and “unhealthy” historical perspectives. On the one hand, “tradition” is “a positive and useful social 
force. It is an appreciation of one’s cultural heritage that provides a perspective from which to connect current 
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into more complex and sophisticated forms over time. That is, the individual 
(UL) and organizational (LL) values that functioned effectively in a previous 
era are inapposite to a social and cultural context that is vastly different now 
than in the past. Indeed, for a person who was not born wealthy, white, and 
male in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century America, the “old days” might 
not be considered particularly “good” at all.62 
This is not to say that the past should be ignored entirely. To the contrary, 
“analyzing the changes in the profession gives us an appropriate and very 
important historical perspective on the present struggle to define 
professionalism.”63 But ironically, such a historical analysis tends to 
undermine the concept of an “ethical golden age”64 or a “hypothesized happier 
era”65 by revealing that the legal profession of old suffered from its own set of 
prejudicial limitations that seem reprehensible today.66 In other words, even if 
there is some truth to the notion that lawyers in the past were more civil toward 
one another and were held in higher esteem (both by themselves and the 
public), it is equally valid to argue that the reasons for this civility are not 
 
circumstances to the past, and hence improve the understanding of both.” Id. On the other hand, mere 
“traditionalism” is characterized by “a superficial and simplistic appreciation of one’s heritage that provides no 
meaningful sense of perspective and judgment. It is a reverence of the past for its own sake—a nostalgia for 
the ‘good old days.’” Id. 
 62 In his introduction to Llewellyn’s famous lectures on the law, aptly titled The Bramble Bush, Steve 
Sheppard writes: 
In 1929, law schools had only recently become the elite preparation for the practice of law, 
replacing . . . the older system of apprenticeships in lawyers’ offices. Llewellyn’s students, by 
and large, were clever and wealthy young white men. There were only a few women, the first 
women students having been admitted to Columbia’s Law School only two years before. The 
price of tuition and the recently instituted aptitude tests for admissions ensured the other 
conditions. 
Today, there are many more law schools, and law schools are much more aware of their roles 
in developing leadership for a diverse and globalized community. Although cost is still a barrier, 
loans and scholarships have opened the doors much wider than they were then. 
Steve Sheppard, Introduction to LLEWELLYN, supra note 57, at xiii–xiv.  
 63 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 408. 
 64 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 4. 
 65 Rhode, supra note 59, at 284. 
 66 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 409 (“The heritage of Bar associations, like that of all trade 
organizations, rests initially in self-interest and protectionism rather than any noble spirit of public service.”). 
The authors further point out that bar associations in the past often exhibited “all the classic ‘negative’ features 
of a closed club,” including high barriers to entry based on race, class, religion, and other social and personal 
factors; slow growth and low competition among members resulting from tight controls over advertising and 
admission; and a belief that explicit, written professional standards were unnecessary for a profession 
characterized by cultural homogeneity, where bar members shared an implicit understanding of behavioral 
norms based on their common social heritage. Id. at 410–11. 
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something we could or should want to replicate today—namely, the closed-off, 
“elite” status of a bar lacking in diversity and replete with racial, cultural, and 
class discrimination. 
Although it is to be welcomed, the increased LL diversity within the bar 
has nonetheless made the shared values that should define the profession “hard 
to pin down.”67 Because lawyers now come from a wide variety of 
backgrounds, “[w]hat was once understood or assumed concerning appropriate 
behavior no longer pertains generally. Instead, the standards that supposedly 
characterize the practice of law are vague, lack serious moral force, and are 
constantly being challenged or rethought.”68 
The conflict arising from the different value systems now represented in the 
bar has both micro and macro components. As an example of the former, an 
individual lawyer’s family history, socioeconomic background, or self-
identification with a particular racial, ethnic, or political group might help 
shape her beliefs about the proper role of lawyers and the values they should 
represent. At a macro level, broad cultural beliefs about justice, rights, liberty, 
and the rule of law shift over time and influence both how lawyers behave and 
how society as a whole views the legal profession and the interests it serves.69 
Some argue that “recent trends in legal education and scholarship reflect a shift 
from valuing justice to viewing law as simply an instrument to achieve certain 
political, social, and economic ends of others regardless of the means.”70 
 
 67 ABA, BLUEPRINT, supra note 11, at 10. 
 68 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 412. 
 69 For example, Terrell and Wildman note that the rise of the “can do” lawyer (i.e., one willing to be as 
“creative” with the law as possible to achieve a client’s lawful ends) has been influenced by the emergence of 
“[r]ights-[c]onsciousness” in the public mind. Id. at 415. That is, the “law is no longer viewed as a 
conservative social institution that reveres the past and is suspicious of change,” but rather “the popular image 
of the law today is that of a dynamic social force that can, and should, vindicate the ‘rights’ of citizens.” Id.; 
accord Daicoff, supra note 46, at 564 (noting that in the 1950s and 1960s, “lawyers were celebrated heroes 
when they acted as instruments to vindicate clients’ rights regardless of the morality of the clients’ goals” and 
that this client-based orientation “became mainstream” during the 1970s through its incorporation into the 
ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility). 
  Note also that, at both micro and macro levels, value systems are subjective constructs in the interior 
dimension of either an individual or a group. Although concepts like rights, liberty, and justice are reflected 
throughout American history and explicitly represented in the United States Constitution, the manifestations of 
these values in the exterior world are not the source of the values themselves. The Bill of Rights, objectively 
speaking, is nothing more than a collection of lines and shapes scratched onto a piece of parchment. The 
meaning of the Bill of Rights, then, only exists in, emerges from, and evolves through the interior LL 
dimension in the form of shared values that develop over time and form the cultural background of individuals 
living within it. 
 70 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 560. 
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In addition to cultural changes, LR structural changes and broad economic 
trends have further eroded incentives to adhere to high professional 
standards.71 Reduced barriers to entry in the legal market and readily available 
student loans have led to a steady increase in the number of American law 
schools (now totaling 201,72 with more being accredited each year) despite 
rising tuitions.73 As a result, approximately 45,000 new lawyers graduate each 
year to compete for an estimated 30,000 available positions, many of which 
will not pay enough to even cover the interest on their student loans.74 
Meanwhile, globalization and advances in communication technology are 
causing some firms to consider cutting costs by exporting traditional first-year 
associate work overseas.75 
From an LR perspective, the objective fact that more lawyers are 
competing for clients increases the economic incentive to cut corners, fight 
dirty, or otherwise ignore professional standards to get the job done by any 
lawful means. Clients confronted with an attorney who refuses to compromise 
her values (i.e., tells the client “no”) will have ample opportunity to seek out 
another one who feels less constrained. In an economic environment 
characterized by reduced employment opportunities and uncertain job security, 
this might be a risk that many young lawyers are unwilling to take. Finally, the 
existing LR mechanisms that supposedly enable the legal profession to self-
regulate (i.e., bar association disciplinary procedures and judicial sanctions) 
have arguably failed due to lack of enforcement and inadequate incentives for 
reporting one’s peers.76 
 
 71 See Rhode, supra note 59, at 284 (“Discontent with legal practice is increasingly pervasive and is 
driven by structural factors that are widening the distance between professional ideals and professional 
work.”). 
 72 ABA-Approved Law Schools, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/approvedlawschools/ 
approved.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2011). 
 73 Mark Greenbaum, No More Room at the Bench, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2010/jan/08/opinion/la-oe-greenbaum8-2010jan08. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Heather Timmons, Outsourcing to India Draws Western Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at 
B1 (“India’s legal outsourcing industry has grown in recent years from an experimental endeavor to a small 
but mainstream part of the global business of law.”). 
 76 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 559. The failure to adequately self-police may also be due to the “false 
premise that a collegium will supervise itself” rather than remain silent in the face of misconduct by peers so 
as to preserve the maximum amount of professional autonomy for each individual. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 
12. 
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B. Upper Quadrants: Individual Symptoms 
Although concerns about professionalism among lawyers have been present 
for some time, the sheer breadth and scope of the LL/LR changes that have 
taken place over the last half century or so appear to have brought many of 
these festering problems to a head. These problems, however, are not limited to 
large-scale, broad trends within the profession. Rather, they manifest in the 
UL/UR dimensions as well—in the psychological and physiological well-being 
of individual lawyers. Although it can be argued that such matters are not 
directly relevant to the concept of professionalism, from an Integral 
perspective it is essential to take individual interiors and exteriors into account. 
Using an empirical approach, Susan Daicoff has compiled a large amount 
of evidence attesting to the fact that the decline in professionalism has 
accelerated in recent decades.77 In addition to diagnosing the broader social 
and cultural trends discussed above, however, she devotes a considerable 
amount of time to “internal, psychological” causes and cures.78 Daicoff argues 
that the profession is now facing a “tripartite crisis” consisting of (1) the 
decline of professionalism among lawyers (i.e., a decline in UR quadrant 
behavior); (2) the decline in public opinion about lawyers and the legal 
profession in general (i.e., a decline in LL community opinion about the law); 
and (3) the growing dissatisfaction of lawyers themselves in their chosen 
profession (i.e., a decline in personal satisfaction and self-esteem in the UL 
quadrant).79 Citing a variety of statistics, surveys, and psychological studies, 
Daicoff argues that these three interdependent phenomena have created a 
vicious cycle—described here with the addition of Integral terminology: 
As professionalism declines and lawyers become increasingly 
competitive, crass, commercial, discourteous, and rude [in their UR 
behavior], public opinion [in the LL] likely deteriorates. As public 
opinion deteriorates, [it affects the UL dimension as] lawyer 
satisfaction, morale, and pride in the profession are likely to decrease. 
As lawyers become less satisfied, they are likely to exhibit 
depression, anxiety, and hostility [as their UL interiors are reflected 
 
 77 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 549–57. 
 78 See id. Although Daicoff makes a distinction between “internal” and “external” factors, id. at 557, her 
analysis of certain factors differs somewhat from where these would be located on the Integral map. This 
seems to be due in part to the fact that she does not differentiate between the individual and collective 
dimensions. That is, in Daicoff’s formulation, “internal” refers specifically to the UL dimension, with all other 
factors (including cultural values) being external. For this reason, her internal/external terminology will not be 
used here. 
 79 Id. at 549. 
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in their UR behavioral patterns]. Lawyers have been shown to cope 
with such psychological discomfort and tension [UL psychological 
pathologies] by abusing alcohol and drugs, by becoming socially 
isolated, and by becoming more ambitious and aggressive 
[pathological UR behavior]. In turn, alcohol and drug abuse can 
result in unethical behavior and increased hostility, [and] social 
isolation can encourage unprincipled behavior, . . . if not outright 
ethical violations. The resulting attorney behavior is likely to further 
erode professionalism.80 
In addition, some of the most alarming evidence regarding the state of the legal 
profession today demonstrates that rates of alcoholism,81 substance abuse,82 
and depression83 have steadily risen among lawyers and law students in recent 
years. 
The influence and importance of the UL quadrant is underrepresented in 
the professionalism literature. Yet the fields of moral, cognitive, and 
behavioral psychology could have a meaningful impact on the ways that 
professionalism is assessed and taught, and an Integral approach should 
include them all. Doing so would allow for a more realistic appraisal of what 
the professionalism movement can hope to accomplish and would help in the 
design of more effective methodologies to achieve its goals. For example, 
“empirical data collected over the last forty years about attorneys and law 
students, including personality characteristics, demographics, values, goals, 
motives, decision-making styles, and moral development has provided 
evidence that, in many cases, attorneys differ from the general population.”84 
In other words, lawyers are a unique breed, and these unique psychological 
traits are exactly what make them good at what they do. However, the same 
traits may be to blame for what some perceive to be a lack of professionalism 
in lawyers’ behavior. Thus, Daicoff argues that many of the proposed 
“solutions” to the professionalism problem “are likely to fail without an 
understanding and respect for these inherent lawyer attributes.”85 
 
 80 Id. at 549–50 (footnotes omitted). 
 81 Id. at 555–56 (“About nine to ten percent of the general population in the United states is alcoholic, 
while empirical studies consistently show that about eighteen percent of lawyers and law students is 
alcoholic.” (footnote omitted)). 
 82 Id. at 555 (“Estimates of the frequency of substance abuse problems, including alcoholism, among 
lawyers range from three to thirty times that of the general population.”). 
 83 Nineteen to twenty percent of practicing lawyers are clinically depressed, compared to only three to 
nine percent of the general population. Id. at 556. 
 84 Id. at 548. 
 85 Id. 
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This Integral diagnosis of the professionalism problem can be summarized 








   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







Interior                                     Exterior 
 
UPPER LEFT (UL) 
 
• Disagreement over morals 
• Win-at-all-costs mentality 
• Loss of job satisfaction 
• Depression/addiction 
• Attorney-specific 
psychological traits (e.g., 
Myers–Briggs typology) 
 
UPPER RIGHT (UR) 
 
• Incivility/“Rambo tactics” 
• Poor treatment of clients 
• Alcohol/substance abuse 
 
 
LOWER LEFT (LL) 
 
• Breakdown of club 
• Postmodern moral 
relativism 
• Lack of community values 
• Increased litigiousness 
• Emphasis on money 
• Public opinion of lawyers 
 
LOWER RIGHT (LR) 
 
• More law schools = more 
lawyers = more competition 
for clients 
• Economic crisis 
• Layoffs/outsourcing 
• Failure of profession’s self-
policing system 
Figure 2: Causes and Symptoms of the Professionalism Crisis 
The inherent characteristics of the legal profession, as well as the changes 
that have led to the current status quo, can thus be viewed both in the interior 
dimensions (i.e., individual and group psychology and value systems) and the 
exterior dimensions (i.e., changes in UR conduct and in LR social institutions, 
market conditions, technology, and so on). The result of these changes has 
been an “unbearable level of competition and pressure in today’s legal 
practice” that is “often blamed for a perceived ‘shocking’ increase in poor 
behavior . . . by American lawyers.”86 However, while developments in recent 
decades may have exacerbated underlying problems and brought latent issues 
 
 86 Id. at 558–59. 
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to the fore, concern about lawyer professionalism has been long-lived and 
persistent within the profession. Indeed, no matter how many articles are 
written or symposia held on professionalism, it seems unlikely that the issue 
will go away any time soon. 
III.  AN INTEGRAL PERSPECTIVE ON PROFESSIONAL VALUES 
With the four quadrants as a reference point, some of the values and 
practices that have been identified as representing professionalism can be 
mapped out in terms of their particular operational domains. In some areas, the 
concepts of levels and lines can also help flesh out a more complete 
understanding of how professionalism might be both assessed and conveyed to 
practicing attorneys. To that end, the six-part model of professionalism 
developed by Timothy Terrell and James Wildman provides a useful starting 
point for mapping professionalism onto the four quadrants of the Integral 
model.87 As compared to more simplistic formulations of professionalism as 
mere civil behavior, or consisting solely of work for an elusive common good, 
Terrell and Wildman’s model is a good place to begin because it already 
addresses a wide range of issues in both the interiors and exteriors of 
individuals and groups. An Integral analysis, however, can make these six 
dimensions of professionalism (and the tensions that often exist between them) 
more explicit by expanding the definition of each to include its operation in all 
four quadrants. In doing so, moreover, this approach can indicate whether 
some dimensions are underrepresented and suggest where it might be 
worthwhile to include additional considerations found in the professionalism 
literature. 
A. Six Foundational Elements: The Terrell–Wildman Model 
To summarize, Terrell and Wildman suggest that professionalism can be 
characterized by six distinct but interrelated elements, which together form the 
substantive “essence” of the term.88 These are (1) respect for the system and 
the rule of law;89 (2) respect for other lawyers;90 (3) an ethic of excellence;91 
 
 87 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 424–31. 
 88 Id. at 424. In the same way that each of the four quadrants are both distinct dimensions of reality and 
an interrelated whole, the six elements identified as the foundation of professionalism are “individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient,” and “all six must be combined together and given their proper weights to 
form the full meaning of the term.” Id. 
 89 An extension of the ethic of integrity, respect for the legal system implies a duty to explain to clients 
why a chosen course of action either supports or degrades the rule of law in society. Id. at 426–27. This is a 
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(4) an ethic of integrity;92 (5) accountability;93 and (6) responsibility for the 
adequate distribution of legal services.94 Although each of these components is 
necessary, Terrell asserts that respect for the system and the rule of law is “the 
key value in the constellation that comprises professionalism.”95 This is 
because all of these values, and indeed the whole concept of legal 
professionalism itself (as distinguished from, say, medical professionalism), 
are justified by and founded upon the rule of law as a universal American 
value.96 As such, this element seems an appropriate place to begin an Integral 
analysis. 
1. Respect for the System and the Rule of Law as First Principle 
One reason that respect for the legal system and the rule of law (an LL 
cultural value supporting an LR system) can form a sturdy foundation on 
which to construct a model of professionalism is that it anchors this value to 
something tangible—the exterior–collective (LR) dimension. Here, the exterior 
forms and functioning of the legal system—the written codes and statutes, the 
volumes of case law, the established rules and procedures for addressing 
grievances and settling disputes, and even the physical networks of 
courtrooms, prisons, and law firms that exist throughout the United States—
establish the basis for defining professional values while themselves remaining 
independent of those values (because values are an interior phenomenon) and 
thus somewhat insulated from shifting political and cultural winds.97 By 
 
broader interest serving the cohesiveness and stability of American society as a whole. Therefore, it trumps 
any individual interest a particular client may have in subverting professional values for personal gain. 
 90 This element can be described as “resisting the urge to blame unfavorable circumstances or results on 
other lawyers or on judges.” Terrell, supra note 36, at 479. 
 91 This element can be described as “the effort consistently to provide the client the best possible legal 
assistance.” Id. 
 92 This element can be described as “a responsibility to say ‘no’ to a client that asks for assistance that is 
inconsistent with basic professional values, and a corresponding courage to say ‘yes’ to a client that seeks 
appropriate, but controversial, legal assistance.” Id. 
 93 Accountability is a commitment to both clients and the public to be “forthright in explaining and 
justifying the fees charged for professional services.” Id. at 480. 
 94 This is defined in Terrell and Wildman’s model as the responsibility either to personally engage in pro 
bono legal assistance or to support the delivery of such assistance through other means (e.g., monetary 
contributions to a legal-aid fund). Id. 
 95 Id. at 528. 
 96 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 422 (“The traditions, heritage, and perspectives of Americans are 
now so disparate and isolated within ever smaller subcommunities that no common purpose, direction, or 
moral values connect us fundamentally. Except our system of law.”). 
 97 To say that the legal system is independent of cultural values is of course not entirely accurate, as the 
system itself is informed and shaped by the values of those who put it into place. Again, all of the quadrants 
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orienting professionalism toward the goal of maintaining the proper LR 
functioning of the legal system, this view thereby manages to sidestep many of 
the difficult issues that arise when professionalism’s tenets are initially derived 
from interior moral principles.98 
The utility of this LR-centered approach is apparent when it is contrasted 
with professionalism models that originate in the interior dimensions. A 
definition articulated by Neil Hamilton, for example, begins with the 
individual–interior (UL) dimension and draws upon concepts from moral 
psychology to establish “personal conscience in a professional context as the 
foundation of professionalism.”99 In addition, Hamilton argues that every 
lawyer has a duty to “engage in a continuing reflective engagement, over a 
career, on the relative importance of income and wealth in light of the other 
principles of professionalism.”100 Indeed, personal conscience and the duty to 
reflect on one’s personal goals in light of one’s professional role are important 
elements for developing professionalism as an individual and will be discussed 
more thoroughly below. But the problem with a primarily UL-oriented 
approach is that it provides no fixed, objective, generally-agreed-upon 
reference point for broad principles that can be applied across a wide range of 
individuals in a highly diverse legal profession.101 
Similarly, attempts to derive principles of professionalism from the notion 
of the common good lack an objective basis for determining to whom common 
refers or how the good is to be defined.102 In Integral terminology, these 
approaches begin with the interior–collective (LL) quadrant and then derive 
guiding principles for the other quadrants based on the values shared by a 
 
are interdependent and do not operate in isolation. Still, a shift in values does not magically change the law as 
it is written, but rather this interior shift only becomes the law through concrete exterior manifestation in new 
legislation. Even where a particular judge interprets the law according to his or her own interior values, if such 
a ruling is contrary to the overall system, it will likely be corrected for in other rulings. Thus, the exterior, LR 
form of the law does maintain a separate existence from the LL system of values on which it is based. 
 98 For example, the assertion that lawyers should strive to be good people. This is not to say that morality 
has no part in a definition of professionalism, and certainly not to suggest that striving to be a good person 
should not be encouraged, but only that it is problematic as a starting point or overall foundation for a broadly 
applicable definition of professionalism. 
 99 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 4. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Particularly troubling in a postmodern society is the component of “personal conscience” described as 
“a sense of obligation to be and to do what is morally good.” Id. at 8–9. If we consider, for example, the 
possible disparity between the personal moral consciences of a federal prosecutor and a public defender, we 
would have an exceptionally difficult time objectively justifying which system of values is more or less in line 
with the duties of professionalism. 
 102 See Terrell, supra note 36, at 528. 
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particular group (e.g., how the legal system should operate, what kind of fees 
should be charged, how lawyers should behave, what individual moral values 
are “right”). Because American society is not a singular community but rather 
a multitude of overlapping smaller communities—including the tired, the poor, 
the wealthy, the environmentalists, the corporations, the left, the right, and 
everyone in between—there will inevitably be conflicts between the perceived 
common good that lawyers representing those groups seek to serve. By what 
criteria, then, do we choose what groups’ values should prevail? 
Although the UL-, LL-, or UR-centered103 approaches to professionalism 
are not sufficiently tethered to the exterior legal system itself, the scope of the 
definition should also not be limited to the LR quadrant.104 An Integral 
approach stresses the need to honor and include all quadrants, and thus an 
adequate conception of professionalism must address interior values and 
individual behavior even where it uses the LR quadrant as a reference point for 
exploring the other dimensions. 
In Terrell and Wildman’s formulation, then, the shared LL value which 
supports the legal system in the LR is the common respect for and acceptance 
of this system within the mind of the American public. Among the multitude of 
diverse communities that make up modern society, this “ingrained expectation 
of official non-arbitrariness” in the LR functioning of the legal system—or 
what we might call equal justice—represents a common LL denominator for 
establishing professional values.105 However divergent various beliefs about 
 
 103 An example of an exterior–individual approach would be one that focuses more or less exclusively on 
individual behavior as the foundation of professionalism. These approaches tend to advocate mere “civility,” 
or what might be thought of as lawyers’ “bedside manner,” as being synonymous with professionalism. See 
Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 419–20. Although such approaches do deal with concrete, exterior 
actions, they do not really address the professionalism issue in regard to the legal profession. “[U]nder this 
approach, a lawyer is no more entitled to the label of ‘professional’ than is, say, a prostitute or a plumber.” Id. 
 104 The problem with a purely exterior LR approach is illuminated by the case of the hypothetical citizen 
in Nazi Germany who “illegally” refuses to turn in the Jewish family living next door. See Terrell, supra note 
36, at 533. A conception of professionalism that does not accept the legal (as distinct from moral) validity of 
interior, normative moral principles (fundamental rights) would hold that a lawyer who refuses to prosecute 
the offender is in fact violating his professional duties. Id. Although this is admittedly an extreme example, it 
nonetheless suggests that in at least some cases, the professional duty of fealty to the letter of the law should 
give way to the individual moral obligation of an attorney “to take a more active role in assessing the moral 
and political values that are reflected not only in the relatively narrow and specific rules that comprise the legal 
system, but also in its deeper normative substance as well.” Id. at 534. This line is, obviously, very hard to 
draw, and that effort will have to be left for another day. The point for the purposes of this Comment is simply 
that an Integral view of professionalism requires acknowledging that it functions in all four dimensions, even 
where one dimension is more appropriate as a foundation for the analysis. 
 105 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 423. 
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the moral or political substance of the law might be, the LL value of respecting 
the system itself is virtually universal to American society simply because 
every citizen is subject to it. Therefore, the LL value of the rule of law is the 
most appropriate foundation for defining the other values that should bind the 
profession in charge of maintaining the legal system itself.106 
2. Respect for Other Legal Professionals 
It is a short logical step from the value of respecting the system and the rule 
of law to the principle that lawyers should respect other professionals who 
serve as its agents. This second value thus prescribes that lawyers regulate their 
own individual behavior (UR) so as not to denigrate others in the legal 
community or otherwise undermine mutual respect for the legal system. Here, 
then, is where civility fits into the professionalism discussion. Although this is 
admittedly a difficult concept to define in any concrete way, linking civility to 
the social function of the lawyer as an agent of the legal system at least 
provides some guidance beyond the vague admonishment that lawyers should 
simply be polite to one another. That is: 
Because that function is based on the principle of the rule of law and 
its critical importance to our culture, our duty to that principle 
demands concomitantly that we respect the law’s practitioners as 
well. This means not only that lawyers should treat each other with a 
certain courteousness in order to permit the legal system to function 
without unnecessary interference, but in addition it means that 
lawyers have a particular responsibility in conversations with clients 
to avoid holding judges and other lawyers in disrepute.107 
Lawyering inevitably involves conflict, usually between opposing parties 
but also sometimes between the interests of the attorney and her client. 
Advocating forcefully for a position, however, should nonetheless be 
constrained by this allegiance to the legal system as a whole. Thus, civility’s 
place among the professional values arises not from morality but from the legal 
system itself. It is lawyers’ LR social function as agents of the law that should 
guide and constrain their UR conduct and LL mutual respect for one another, 
irrespective of their UL personal values and opinions about their fellow 
practitioners. 
 
 106 There are, of course, arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Penegar, The Professional 
Project: A Response to Terrell and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J. 473, 481–84 (1992) (critiquing Terrell and 
Wildman’s use of “functional structuralism” to justify their professional values). 
 107 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 427. 
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3. Excellence in Four Quadrants 
Respect for the system and the rule of law, and its correlative duty to act 
respectfully toward other members of the legal community, provides the basic 
foundation for Terrell and Wildman’s definition of professionalism. But the 
remaining four elements are no less essential, and the authors assert that the 
“most central” of these, in a practical sense, is the “dedication to excellence in 
the services rendered to a client.”108 Regardless of the type of client being 
served, such excellence encompasses more than mere competence as required 
by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct109 and might be thought of instead 
as the duty to exceed expectations. Adapting this concept to the Integral 
framework, at least four distinct facets of excellence can be found by viewing 
it from the perspective of each quadrant. 
The most obvious dimension of excellence is that found in the UR 
quadrant, as here it pertains to individual behavior. Components of 
professional excellence in the UR would include being diligent, performing 
disciplined and efficient work, responding timely to clients and other attorneys, 
meeting deadlines, proofreading documents, conducting thorough research, 
and observing all the other behaviors that clients should expect whether they 
are paying a fee or receiving pro bono services.110 In the UR, excellence is thus 
a narrow concept meaning that one effectively gets the job done. The challenge 
here is then to maintain this standard of excellence in the face of time pressures 
and other commitments inside and outside of one’s life at work. 
In the UL quadrant, excellence consists of more than a style of behavior. It 
is instead an interior value—an ethic or “more pervasive attitude.”111 Here the 
ethic of excellence consists of a long-term personal commitment to performing 
at the highest level that one’s knowledge and skills will allow. “It is a deeper 
sense of direction concerning how to conduct oneself as a professional and 
what to expect from one’s colleagues.”112 We might also include as part of this 
commitment the duty to continue to advance one’s knowledge and improve on 
one’s skills throughout a career. To that end, the concepts of levels and lines 
can be useful in assessing one’s development in the UL dimension. The 
practice of law involves a number of distinct skill sets or lines of development 
 
 108 Id. at 424. 
 109 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.1 (2009). 
 110 These may be considered the procedural measures of excellence, as opposed to the substantive ones 
that give rise to these behaviors in the first place. Terrell, supra note 36, at 486. 
 111 Id. at 485. 
 112 Id. at 485–86. 
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(e.g., research, writing, editing, communication skills, oratory skills). The 
foundation for these skills is generally established in law school, but through 
continued study and practical experience the core concepts in each area can be 
combined and built upon to advance one’s overall abilities.113 
Moving into the collective dimensions, the ethic of excellence takes on a 
particularly important role. In the LL, this value is better described as a culture 
of excellence—an explicit, pervasive, shared commitment to excellence within 
the corporate culture of a firm or other organization: “Within these entities, this 
aspect of professionalism means a responsibility of the group to create 
internally an ‘environment’ of excellence. That is, the group must develop a 
commitment of its own that its members will be the best lawyers they can 
be.”114 These collective cultural backgrounds exert a powerful gravitational 
influence on the individuals who operate within them. They serve as a hidden 
force that can help to both bring out the best in individuals whose own 
development is below the group standard and discourage individual conduct 
that exceeds collective expectations (e.g., through peer pressure or the fear of 
being labeled a “Goody Two-shoes”). For this reason, it is essential that firms 
make the commitment to excellence an explicit and frequently emphasized 
element of their organizational culture. 
Although empirical research on the topic is relatively sparse, at least some 
studies have shown that one of the most effective means for instilling 
professional values such as an ethic of excellence is through mentoring 
programs, both formal and informal.115 The intersubjective LL relationship 
 
 113 Thus, in terms of both assessing and developing excellence in individual attorneys, levels and lines can 
serve as a guideline for firms in establishing benchmarks for their associates and partners, with different 
expectations for performance depending on the attorney’s level of experience. 
 114 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 425. In an international context, this becomes significantly more 
challenging when cultural differences in LL values are taken into account. Different cultural beliefs and 
expectations among nations present the difficult question of “whether the value of professional ‘excellence’ is 
the same everywhere or whether understandings of its practical meaning vary from one part of the world to 
another.” Terrell, supra note 36, at 486. Accordingly, it may be necessary for firms working in an international 
context to develop different guidelines informed by an LL analysis of a particular cultural or social context. 
 115 See, e.g., Neil Hamilton & Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, Fostering Professionalism Through Mentoring, 57 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 102, 113–14 (2007). Hamilton and Brabbit note that while professionalism mentoring in the 
legal context has received little attention in empirical research, at least one study in the medical field found 
that “clinically oriented learning approaches . . . were the ‘most effective’ means of fostering professionalism, 
with role modeling by faculty rated as the ‘most effective’ of these approaches.” Id. at 113. Another study on 
senior medical residents’ views on professionalism reported that “[t]he large majority of the residents listed 
contact with, and observation of, positive role models as their preferred method of learning . . . professionalism 
virtues and skills [such as competence, respect, and empathy].” Id. This makes sense because mentoring and 
role-modeling programs operate in the same LL dimension as the shared values they seek to instill. To the 
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between mentor and mentee is rewarding for the mentor and can have a 
powerful formative effect on the mentee in socializing them into a firm’s 
professional culture.116 This suggests that firms seeking to establish a strong 
LL culture of excellence would do well to set up formal LR programs for 
mentoring young associates that specifically address professionalism. Firms 
should be willing to back up their dedication to core professional values by 
providing external support in the LR for developing those values in the UL and 
LL dimensions. “This means that the group, as a matter of its understanding of 
its place in our general professional heritage, must be willing to invest . . . in 
appropriate support services and resources to enable its lawyers to flourish 
professionally . . . .”117 
Currently, “[t]he scholarly literature on mentoring . . . does not define 
mentoring to include the principles of professionalism.”118 Instead, the role of 
mentoring is viewed more in terms of professional development as it relates to 
career advancement, “technical knowledge[,] and [the] relationship skills 
necessary for the professional role.”119 Yet a firm seeking to create an LL ethic 
of excellence, and to instill other core values of the legal profession in young 
associates, would benefit from making professionalism a more prominent part 
of its LR training programs. Having exterior support for developing interior 
values is essential to ensuring that those values are transmitted as an important 
part of a firm’s professional culture. Separating the professionalism function 
from the technical or career-oriented mentoring functions would thus help to 
emphasize the importance of professionalism as a distinct component of 
attorney development.120 This is a “unique additional obligation” for peer-
review professions like the law, which are granted a certain level of autonomy 
 
extent such programs are formally established, they necessarily involve LR logistics and structural support, but 
it is the interpersonal LL relationship that is created between the mentor and mentee that has a formative 
influence on the mentee’s individual values. 
 116 In one of the few studies done in a legal context, participants in a two-year pilot project for the State 
Bar of Georgia’s Transition into Law Practice Program reported that “the mentoring functions most strongly 
realized ‘were the handling of ethical aspects of law practice and dealing with other lawyers.’” Id. at 114 
(quoting Transition into Law Practice Program Pilot Project, STATE BAR OF GA. 15–16, http://gabar.org/ 
public/pdf/tilpp/7-C.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2011)). 
 117 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 425. Again, for firms that take part in international networks 
dedicated to fostering professionalism, such as Lex Mundi, this means devoting adequate technological and 
economic resources to enable the creation of shared LL values, such as conferences and symposia dealing with 
topics related to professionalism. 
 118 Hamilton & Brabbit, supra note 115, at 106. 
 119 Id. at 109. 
 120 Id. 
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and independence by society with the expectation that they will self-regulate to 
maintain high standards in line with their critical social function.121 
To summarize, then, excellence is indeed an important value to 
professionalism, and it has a distinct meaning within each of the four 
quadrants. At the individual level, excellence is both a personal attitude of 
doing one’s best (UL) and a behavior that reflects that commitment (UR). In 
the collective dimensions, excellence entails the conscious and intentional 
development of a culture of excellence within a firm or interfirm organization 
(LL), as well as the necessary investment in structural support systems for 
enabling the development of professionalism to take place (LR). Formal 
mentoring programs are a key part of this process. Finally, the commitment to 
excellence overall can be justified as necessary to maintaining both the 
structural integrity of the legal system (LR) and the public confidence that the 
system is working properly (LL). 
4. Integrity as Harmony Between Quadrants 
At least one commentator has argued that integrity is the “most important 
element” of professionalism.122 In many ways it is also the most difficult to 
define. Generally speaking, the term refers to the notion that, “[a]t a minimum, 
persons of integrity are individuals whose practices are consistent with their 
principles, even in the face of strong countervailing pressures.”123 Indeed, it 
seems useless to go about defining values like the commitment to excellence 
and respect for other lawyers if those values are not reflected in actual 
behavior. In Integral terms, then, personal integrity can be broadly defined as a 
consistent harmony between a person’s UL values and UR behavior—
practicing what one preaches or “walking the talk.” This is all well and good, 
but as Deborah Rhode points out: “Fanatics may be loyal to their values, but 
we do not praise them for integrity.”124 Rather, when we speak of integrity we 
tend to be looking for “a willingness to adhere to values that reflect some 
reasoned deliberation, based on logical assessment of relevant evidence and 
 
 121 Id. 
 122 Burnele V. Powell, The Limits of Integrity or Why Cabinets Have Locks, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 
312 (2003). 
 123 Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333, 335 
(2003). 
 124 Id. Thus, while integrity can be conceived of as separate from morality as “simply . . . a matter of 
being true to one’s commitments,” the term nonetheless seems to connote some indication that those values or 
commitments to which one adheres are in themselves “good” or desirable. Nancy Schauber, Integrity, 
Commitment and the Concept of a Person, 33 AM. PHIL. Q. 119, 120 (1996). 
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competing views.”125 In other words, to say that professional integrity demands 
that a lawyer act consistently in accordance with their values is not useful if we 
do not also say something about what those values should be. As Hamlet might 
say, “[A]y, there’s the rub.”126 
The difficulty in defining integrity for the legal profession stems from the 
fact that lawyers are in the business of serving clients’ interests. The question 
thus arises whether—and if so, to what extent—a lawyer’s own personal 
values (or broad societal values) should factor into their decisions regarding 
the nature, scope, and method of client representation. From an Integral 
perspective, this dilemma reveals a tension between the interior and exterior 
quadrants. An attorney is both a person, with her own interior values and 
beliefs, and a functional agent within the exterior legal system, operating 
somewhat like a cog in the machine of justice. In taking on the interests of a 
client, however, the lawyer’s own interior values may conflict with her exterior 
social role, and she may be required to advocate for causes with which she 
personally disagrees. In such cases, the attorney’s commitment to integrity 
raises the difficult question of whose values she should be standing up for. 
One way for an attorney to resolve this dilemma is to adopt the “amoral 
professional role.”127 In this view, the lawyer’s own interior dimensions 
become irrelevant as her role is defined solely in terms of her capacity to 
effectively operate within the exterior legal system. This “allows lawyers to 
avoid conflicts between their own personal values and client’s wishes and 
instead rationalize any lawful behavior as long as they are acting to achieve the 
client’s stated goals.”128 In the extreme, the lawyer adopting this role is nothing 
more than a hired gun—a tool that the client can utilize to further his own 
ends. But when the attorney’s professional role is reduced entirely to the 
exterior quadrants, there is little room for professional values over and above 
the bare minimum ethics rules. The hired gun does anything legally 
permissible to further her client’s goals, whatever those goals might be and 
regardless of how the lawyer (or society) feels about them. 
Practically speaking, it is worth noting that the amoral professional role is 
not entirely amoral when viewed from an Integral perspective, at least to the 
extent that the term is meant to convey a complete abandonment of the 
 
 125 Rhode, supra note 123, at 335–36. 
 126 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 3, sc. 1, l. 64 (Ann Thompson & Neil Taylor eds., 2008). 
 127 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 562. 
 128 Id. at 563 (footnote omitted). 
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lawyer’s own interior values. Because all four quadrants co-arise as an 
interrelated whole, it is really impossible for an individual attorney to fully 
divorce her UL values (and the underlying LL cultural values that helped shape 
them) from her exterior social role.129 Even the decision that “I will not 
consider my own values in representing my client’s interests” is itself a value 
judgment reflecting one’s beliefs about the proper role of lawyers in society. 
Therefore, the amoral, or client-centered, role in which the lawyer adopts her 
client’s interests as her own is not necessarily “an empty rationalization but 
instead a rationally chosen value in and of itself.”130 Even so, “[t]he amoral 
professional role has been blamed for fostering unprofessional tactics and 
actions by lawyers in the name of zealous advocacy.”131 Such tactics 
undermine the respectability and basic integrity of the legal system as a means 
for producing just results and contribute to a public perception of lawyers as 
“amoral or evil.”132 
Acknowledging this, Terrell and Wildman argue that lawyers have a 
responsibility to exercise at least some level of independent professional 
judgment and occasionally say “no” to a client: “[P]roviding excellent service 
to a client does not include being the client’s slave.”133 However, as a matter of 
lawyer professionalism—broad principles that are as applicable to plaintiff’s 
attorneys as they are to corporate defense lawyers—it is problematic to draw 
this line by referring to individual morality or “a particular set of conventional 
community values.”134 On one hand, the concept of integrity is meaningful for 
professionalism only if it includes some substantive value in its definition. If 
integrity is to mean something more than merely acting in accordance with 
 
 129 Indeed, attempting to do so may have destructive implications for the attorney’s own mental health and 
well-being. See id. at 574–75 (“[O]ne’s personal or professional actions and identity cannot be independent 
from one’s personal morality. This approach is consistent with the theory that one’s professional and personal 
self-esteem similarly are dependent on one’s actual behavior. Therefore, lawyers cannot possibly be 
comfortable, happy, or fulfilled when they engage in behavior that conflicts with their values.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 279, 279 (2003) 
(“When our conduct and principles clash with each other, the result . . . is cognitive dissonance.”). Luban 
further argues that humans have an inherent drive to reduce such dissonance—either by altering conduct to 
reflect principles or altering principles to justify one’s conduct—and that lawyers overwhelmingly take the 
latter course, or what Luban calls “the low road.” Id. at 280. For a critique of Luban’s condemnation of the 
legal profession, see Terrell, supra note 36, at 504–08. 
 130 Terrell, supra note 36, at 507. Taking this idea even further, Professor Terrell argues that this “rational 
substitution” of the client’s interests for the lawyer’s is actually both an important skill and one of the lawyer’s 
“central values.” Id. 
 131 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 563. 
 132 Id. at 564. 
 133 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 426. 
 134 Terrell, supra note 36, at 510. 
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one’s values, then professionalism should have something to say about what 
those values are and not leave it entirely up to individual moral choices. On the 
other hand, defining those principles according to some notion of the common 
good requires a further definition of what is common to everyone in American 
society and can be universally agreed upon to be good. As previously 
discussed, then, the only apparent value that meets this requirement today is 
the shared respect for our system of laws.135 Thus, “we should infuse into 
‘integrity’ the substance provided by the legal system itself—the very idea of 
the ‘rule of law’—rather than any particular piece of that system.”136 
On some level, it is unavoidable that a lawyer’s personal values will play a 
role in determining how she goes about the practice of law—what sort of 
clients she represents, what causes she champions, and where she chooses to 
work. These are fundamental components of the person’s UL/UR 
dimensions—her beliefs and behaviors—and will always play a formative role 
in her individual choices. Indeed, there are many reasons why both attorney 
and client might benefit from “open, honest discussions of morality . . . in 
which the attorneys freely disclose and honor their own personal beliefs and 
work with the client to decide the best course of action.”137 But to require this 
as something a lawyer should do as a matter of professionalism perhaps goes 
one step too far. A lawyer may choose to bring her personal values to her 
representation of a client, but it is hard to objectively justify why those who 
choose not to should be attacked as unprofessional or lacking in integrity 
because they advocate for an unpopular client or one with whom they 
personally disagree.138 
For professionalism, then, integrity should be defined broadly enough to 
include the consistent adherence to a “principled substitution” of a client’s own 
values and goals in place of the lawyer’s own, so long as those goals are not 
inconsistent with the other principles of professionalism and do not undermine 
the legal system itself.139 As Terrell writes: 
 
 135 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 136 Terrell, supra note 36, at 510. 
 137 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 574. 
 138 For a contrary view, see Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Professionalism and Community: A Response to Terrell 
and Wildman, 41 EMORY L.J. 485, 485 (1992) (attacking Terrell and Wildman’s position as “the privatization 
of morality,” which “plac[es] altruism at the service of self-interest . . . [and] the whole professional enterprise 
at the service of wealth and power”). 
 139 Terrell, supra note 36, at 507–08. 
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While the limits that a lawyer places on his or her zeal in representing 
a client can certainly come from personal sources—one’s religious 
principles, philosophical, and/or political values—all lawyers should 
respect the limits demanded by the legal system. . . . Integrity, as an 
aspect of professionalism, would require a lawyer to say “no” to a 
client not because the lawyer disliked the client’s interests or 
objectives (although the lawyer certainly could decline to represent 
someone on this basis if he or she wanted) but because the lawyer 
believed those interests or objectives would harm or otherwise be 
inconsistent with our professional value of upholding the “rule of 
law” in society.140 
From this perspective, it is thus inaccurate to say that the client-centered 
lawyer acts merely as a “technician whose role is to advance the client’s 
interests zealously without regard to the lawyer’s personal morals or values, 
society’s needs or morals.”141 Rather, the principled substitution of a client’s 
interests for one’s own is in fact a personal value, and one that can be tied to 
both a shared communal respect for the rule of law and society’s need to 
maintain a functioning legal system in which everyone can find 
representation.142 
To return to the Integral model, integrity can be conceptualized as a 
consistent harmony between all four quadrants. It requires one’s UR behavior 
to reflect one’s UL values, but that can include the value of adopting the 
interests of one’s client as one’s own for the purpose of the representation. 
This UL value, then, accords with the shared respect for the rule of law in the 
LL, as well as the value of the attorney–client relationship. One’s UR behavior, 
moreover, must also be in harmony with the LR legal system, and a line should 
be drawn any time a client’s wishes would require acting in a way that is 
disrespectful toward the law and its agents. 
Finally, the LL and LR quadrants must be harmonized as well, which can 
manifest in at least two different contexts. First, the LR legal system must 
legitimately reflect and enact our LL communal goals of promoting fairness, 
 
 140 Id. at 510–11. 
 141 Daicoff, supra note 46, at 563 (footnote omitted). 
 142 The concept of lines may be useful here for differentiating between personal and professional integrity 
for lawyers. Neil Hamilton essentially takes this approach, arguing that the separation of “personal 
conscience” from “personal conscience in a professional context” avoids “the fear that a lawyer’s personal 
conscience will limit client autonomy and client equal access to justice.” Hamilton, supra note 9, at 11. Thus, 
“[t]he central point of ‘personal conscience in a professional context’ is that the lawyer’s personal conscience 
is now informed and guided also by the role morality of the lawyer’s function in the justice system.” Id. 
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justice, and equal access to the law. The system must work, in other words, to 
achieve the purposes for which it was established. Second, integrity in the 
context of law firms requires that an LL commitment to professionalism should 
be matched by LR systems and policies to help develop and promote core 
values. These could include formal mentoring programs emphasizing 
professionalism, pro bono credits for attorneys and contributions to legal aid 
funds, and effective policies for punishing unprofessional behavior. 
To conclude the discussion on integrity, it should be said, oddly enough, 
that the discussion is far from concluded. It is one thing to say that professional 
integrity requires attorneys to draw the line in representing a client’s interests 
only where those interests conflict with the rule of law and not necessarily 
when they conflict with the lawyer’s own moral belief.143 It is another thing 
entirely to attempt to define what specific behaviors violate this principle or 
what types of client goals should be refused. Some examples are obvious: 
frivolous litigation, excessive dilatory tactics, and interference with the 
discovery process. Other issues are less clear, such as the line between zealous 
advocacy and unprofessional “Rambo” behavior. A full treatment of these 
questions, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. The limited purpose 
here is only to point out that the Integral model can be useful for framing the 
discussion. 
5. Accountability and the Duty of Peer Review 
Terrell and Wildman’s definition of accountability is fairly straightforward, 
encompassing the need for lawyers to be transparent regarding the work they 
do for their clients and up-front about their fees. “[C]lients (and by extension, 
society as a whole) are entitled to understand the services that the lawyer 
renders, and moreover to have the sense that the fees charged for those services 
are fair.”144 This somewhat narrow conception of accountability to one’s 
clients (and more abstractly, to the public) is undoubtedly an important 
professional value. It is central to the legitimacy of the social contract that 
grants lawyers their professional independence145 and is closely tied to the 
 
 143 Again, it should be stressed that this is not to discourage attorneys from following their own moral 
convictions in choosing clients or to argue that this has no place in the practice of law. It is instead simply to 
say that, as a matter of what professionalism demands from attorneys, the client-centered approach does not 
inherently conflict with the idea of integrity when that approach is supported by a reasoned dedication to the 
lawyer’s social function as an agent of the legal system. 
 144 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 428 (footnote omitted). 
 145 Id. (“This accountability is the cornerstone of the professional independence lawyers enjoy: people 
generally accept the idea that lawyers need independence in order to provide their full value to society, but the 
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other values of excellence and integrity.146 Yet this definition is a limited one 
and could be expanded significantly to include more than billing concerns. 
An additional facet of accountability that is not found in Terrell and 
Wildman’s formulation is the responsibility to be accountable to one’s peers 
and to the legal system itself. This includes not only a commitment to maintain 
high professional standards in one’s own behavior but also to take at least 
some responsibility for discouraging unprofessional conduct by other lawyers. 
Neil Hamilton includes this “duty of peer review” in his definition of 
professionalism, describing it as a responsibility “to hold other lawyers 
accountable for meeting the minimum standards set forth in the Rules and to 
encourage them to realize core values and ideals of the profession.”147 
In the LL dimension, this duty is closely related to the culture of 
excellence, or what Hamilton refers to as the need to create “strong ethical 
cultures emphasizing excellence at the skills, core values, and ideals of the 
profession.”148 In the LR dimension, this duty is also important to the self-
regulating function of the legal profession. Without viable exterior avenues for 
peer review (e.g., formal channels for reporting unprofessional behavior within 
one’s firm and a corresponding intrafirm culture that encourages one to do so), 
the incentive to confront unprofessional lawyers decreases, and the profession 
may risk becoming a “delinquent community” that cannot adequately supervise 
itself.149 
Admittedly, this duty of accountability and peer review becomes much 
more difficult to define in the context of professionalism as opposed to ethics. 
 
public will continue to believe this only if lawyers respect the reciprocal social demand that they be 
accountable for their services.”). 
 146 It seems more or less apparent that these three values together comprise a basic duty to consistently 
provide services of high value to clients and to explain them fully and honestly. Terrell, however, follows this 
connection to the relatively controversial conclusion that 
[t]he combined values of excellence and accountability in the context of a market of legal 
services not supplied as a government service mean that lawyers in private practice owe a 
primary professional responsibility to fee-paying clients (or salary-paying employers) and only a 
secondary responsibility to society as a whole or to indigents in need of legal assistance. 
Terrell, supra note 36, at 544. Although the responsibility to provide indigent service will be addressed in the 
next subsection, the question of whether a lawyer’s primary responsibility is to his fee-paying client or society 
as a whole is a bit too complicated to address here. This aspect of accountability will instead be foregone in 
favor of expanding the value in a different direction. 
 147 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 8. 
 148 Id. at 12. 
 149 Id. 
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It is easy enough to say that lawyers have a duty to report conduct that violates 
the Model Rules. But even setting aside the potential stigma of being 
considered a “tattle tale,” it is extremely difficult to say when the best lawyers 
have a duty to confront or report another attorney who is acting 
unprofessionally but still within the law. Even if formal channels existed for 
this purpose, the only real sanctions that could be implemented would be 
informal ones—a loss of reputation within the community, a lack of clients 
being recommended your way, or perhaps a loss of opportunity for an 
appointment or promotion. Still, these can be “unofficial but nonetheless 
powerful interdictions” and might go a long way in discouraging 
unprofessional conduct.150 Again, however, this would largely depend on the 
overall LL ethical culture of the firm (or the profession as a whole) and how 
such peer reporting is viewed by others in the community. In any event, the 
concept of professionalism, and specifically the value of accountability, should 
include some notion that one must be accountable to one’s fellow professionals 
and hold them accountable as well. 
6. Ensuring the Adequate Distribution of Legal Services 
The final value in Terrell and Wildman’s model of professionalism, “a 
lawyer’s special responsibility to assist in the effort to distribute legal services 
widely in our society,”151 is by far the most controversial.152 This is not 
because of any question regarding the responsibility itself—indeed, the value 
of public service through pro bono work or other means is included in virtually 
all discussions of professionalism to some degree—but rather because of the 
justifications the authors provide for it and the type of “assistance” they would 
permit. Specifically, they argue that while this duty applies to the entire legal 
profession and is tied to the importance of law in American society, it “is not a 
personal, individual duty to distribute oneself as widely as possible.”153 Rather, 
the decision to personally serve pro bono clients is “an individual moral choice 
not forced by the concept of professionalism.”154 To hold otherwise, the 
authors assert, would turn professionalism into a form of “indentured 
servanthood.”155 
 
 150 Id. (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22 (1986)). 
 151 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 428. 
 152 See, e.g., Richard C. Baldwin, “Rethinking Professionalism”—And Then Living It!, 41 EMORY L.J. 
433, 439 (1992); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Rethinking “The Practice of Law,” 41 EMORY L.J. 451, 452 (1992). 
 153 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 430. 
 154 Id. at 431. 
 155 Id. 
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Because of the complexity of the law, Terrell and Wildman argue that 
requiring personal, direct service by individual attorneys for indigent clients in 
areas with which they might be personally unfamiliar would “inappropriately 
compromise the ethic of excellence.”156 Instead, the responsibility to ensure the 
adequate distribution of legal services is an “enabling” one requiring lawyers 
“to see that the Bar as an entity assists and enables those in the profession who 
desire to do so to distribute legal services widely in society.”157 This includes 
the responsibility for law firms to allow for sufficient time and incentives for 
pro bono service in their internal policies and procedures.158 Perhaps more 
troubling for some, it would also include the possibility that individual 
attorneys could choose to participate in this enabling by paying a “special tax 
or fee . . . that would be used to subsidize the efforts of those Bar members 
interested in providing legal services to indigents.”159 In other words, a lawyer 
could either personally perform the public service required of the profession as 
a whole or simply pay someone to do it for him. 
The enabling approach to pro bono service advocated by Terrell and 
Wildman is consistent with the LR-centered, functionalist approach to 
professionalism underlying their overall model. It seeks to avoid moral 
justifications or prescriptions for providing such service and instead rests on 
the notion that the legal system (and the society that depends on it) will be best 
served if every lawyer is committed to making legal services as widely 
available as possible, but the actual carrying out of that service is done only by 
those who have the time, the expertise, or the inner conviction to dedicate 
themselves to it at the highest level.160 Rather than arguing that those lawyers 
who do not feel a moral calling to pro bono work either should feel it, or else 
should be required to do it anyway, this view instead suggests that these 
individuals should just go about doing what they want to do—work for fee-
paying clients—but be forced to at least subsidize the efforts of others who 
work for free. In this way, the profession as a whole would fulfill its 
 
 156 Id. at 430. This is also tied to the argument that the ethic of excellence, combined with that of 
accountability, means that a lawyer’s primary responsibility is to fee-paying clients. See supra note 146. 
Again, there is much room for debate on this subject that is outside the purposes of this Comment. 
 157 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 430. 
 158 Id. at 431. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Terrell, supra note 36, at 553 (“[W]ide distribution is not the only feature critical to professionalism: 
Whatever legal services are being ‘distributed,’ they must also meet the criteria of ‘excellence,’ ‘integrity,’ 
‘independence,’ and ‘accountability’ that professionalism also demands. Thus, widespread but shoddy and 
haphazard legal services are inconsistent with professionalism.”). 
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responsibility of ensuring the wide distribution of pro bono service while also 
ensuring that the service provided lived up to the other professional values. 
Turning to the Integral model, it is apparent that one dimension notably 
lacking from Terrell and Wildman’s discussion of this issue (and really of 
professionalism as a whole) is the individual–interior quadrant. This is 
primarily due to a desire to justify the principles of professionalism by 
reference to the legal system itself—a functional, structural, LR-centered 
model that achieves a certain level of objectivity and theoretical clarity in 
bypassing discussion of subjective, individual or community morality. For the 
most part, this formulation works well for defining the values of excellence, 
integrity, accountability, and respect for the law and its agents. But dismissing 
messy interiors in favor of more orderly, exterior dimensions is somewhat less 
satisfying where pro bono service is concerned, if only because of how 
strongly the topic implicates moral values like compassion, altruism, fairness, 
and equality. Somewhat ironically, however, including the interior dimensions 
in an Integral analysis of this issue may actually strengthen Terrell and 
Wildman’s argument while expanding it significantly. 
As will be discussed immediately below, an Integral view of this topic 
suggests first that ensuring the widespread distribution of indigent legal service 
and equal access to the justice system is a fundamental responsibility of the 
legal profession. Second, the interior desire to serve others reflects a certain 
stage or level of moral development that is not necessarily present in all 
attorneys, and forcing them to embody such a desire by requiring personal 
service may be counterproductive. Third, individual attorneys should 
nonetheless be required to contribute to the profession’s responsibility either 
through personal service that meets the other requirements of professionalism 
or through contributions to attorneys who specialize in indigent service or to 
legal funds which do the same.161 And finally, regardless of how she chooses 
to contribute, every lawyer has a continuing responsibility to reflect on her 
own interior moral values and to consider these in light of her role as a 
professional and an agent of the legal system. 
As Terrell points out, the first of these principles flows directly from the 
value that American society places on the rule of law and the nature of the 
legal profession’s social contract. “Everyone should have a sense that the legal 
system is available to him or her for redress, vindication, protection, whatever. 
 
 161 To really stir the pot, the amount of this contribution might even be tied to a percentage of annual 
income. 
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For law to serve its function as the social glue that helps hold a society 
together, it cannot be the special province of a select few.”162 Few, if any, 
commentators would likely dispute this principle, even though some would 
base it on more than functional grounds.163 
The second principle—that the calling to serve others reflects a certain 
level of moral development that is not universal to attorneys and that requiring 
personal service may be counterproductive—is less easily derived. Here is 
where the Integral model’s conception of developmental levels and UL-
centered approaches to moral development can help shed some light. For 
example, the work of Lawrence Kohlberg “postulates six stages of moral 
reasoning” that “develop in an invariant sequence; in any person the second 
level evolves after the first, the third after the second, etc.”164 This 
development can broadly be characterized as moving from preconventional 
amoral egocentrism (what is right and good is defined only by self-interest), to 
conventional/sociocentric perspectives (the good is defined in relation to one’s 
family, tribe, nation, or other social group), and finally to postconventional 
worldcentrism (the good is defined in relation to humanity as a whole, 
regardless of individual differences).165 
In the context of professionalism, then, this research helps demonstrate how 
“a professional’s conception of the self in relation to other people changes over 
time as the individual matures.”166 Over the course of a career, an individual 
move[s] from self-centered conceptions of identity through a number 
of transitions, to a moral identity characterized by the expectations of 
a profession—to put the interests of others before the self, or to 
subordinate one’s own ambitions to the service of society or the 
nation. [But t]he fully integrated moral self (one whose personal and 
professional values are fully integrated and consistently applied) 
tends not to develop until mid-life—if it develops at all.167 
 
 162 Terrell, supra note 36, at 552. 
 163 See Baldwin, supra note 152, at 437–38 (“Our social commitment to establishing justice and making 
the machinery of justice available to all members of society . . . represents values fundamental to our 
[democratic] system of government.”). 
 164 Abramson, supra note 43, at 224. 
 165 WILBER, supra note 43, at 45. 
 166 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 9. 
 167 Id. (emphasis added). In addition to moral development, other lines may have implications for 
professionalism. For example:  
[T]he relationship between moral intentions and moral behavior may depend on the presence 
of other variables [besides good intentions], such as ego strength. There are at least two empirical 
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The important insight to take from this research is that the very capacity to care 
about the broader interests of society, as opposed to one’s self-interest or the 
interests of one’s particular client or firm, is not innate but rather the product of 
a lifelong, complex, and dynamic developmental process within the individual 
psyche.168 Accordingly, it is unrealistic to hold a young associate just out of 
law school to the same moral standard of a senior partner, particularly in the 
professional context where this moral development occurs alongside numerous 
other lines of development unique to the practice of law. 
Therefore, imposing exterior requirements for pro bono work on individual 
attorneys whose interior levels of development do not yet allow them to fully 
appreciate the value of such service carries with it the risk of producing 
substandard work. While excellence, integrity, and the other professional 
values are rooted in the exterior legal system, they nonetheless require an 
interior commitment to upholding them in one’s practice. But for an individual 
oriented more toward the self-interest side of moral development, this 
commitment may be hard to maintain.169 This possibility then threatens the 
paramount value in a functional model of professionalism—the integrity of the 
legal system itself—because it demands pro bono service even at the expense 
of the other professional values. 
The first two principles—that the legal profession has an obligation to 
provide widespread public service and that the inner motivation to perform 
 
studies of law students suggesting that ego strength might be impaired, which might explain why 
attorneys report ethical intentions, but these intentions may not be translating into ethical 
behavior. 
Daicoff, supra note 46, at 565 (footnotes omitted). 
 168 Whether this development should be an explicit part of legal training is a matter for further debate, but 
there are certainly good arguments in favor of such programs. See Abramson, supra note 43, at 223 (“[C]ertain 
types of (direct) teaching can promote and accelerate this development in a quite productive fashion.”). 
 169 It should be noted that there are many reasons why pro bono work might be beneficial to one’s self-
interest. Few would likely disagree that service to others can be inherently self-rewarding or that “pro bono 
activity can enrich every lawyer’s professional life.” Brown, supra note 152, at 461. Some commentators have 
even argued that mandatory pro bono service could be a way of alleviating the depression, isolation, and job 
dissatisfaction plaguing many lawyers today. See Donald Patrick Harris, Let’s Make Lawyers Happy: 
Advocating Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 287, 288–89 (1999). Certainly, this Comment is not 
intended to devalue pro bono work or to suggest it is not inherently worthwhile. The basic point here is that not 
everyone will experience it as such and that an appreciation for selfless service cannot be imposed or created 
by mandating it through exterior requirements (indeed, this might even delay its development). Those who 
labor selflessly for the interests of others should be celebrated and encouraged, but it seems contrary to our 
notions of freedom and self-determination to try to force such behavior on every individual attorney or label 
them unprofessional because they do not share a similar commitment (so long as they are willing to contribute 
in other regards). 
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such service may not develop in individual attorneys until later in life (if at 
all)—combine to produce the third. Whatever an individual lawyer’s level of 
UL moral development, the responsibility for public legal service is firmly a 
part of the LL cultural values of the legal profession (and American society). 
Accordingly, anyone entering into the bar should accept this obligation as a 
necessary aspect of their chosen profession. While it may be undesirable or 
counterproductive to mandate morality through requirements for UR individual 
behavior, the profession can still honor its duty by establishing LR programs 
for subsidizing pro bono work done by those capable of performing it with 
excellence and integrity. The imposition of mandatory service through either 
personal performance or a fee required for bar membership would thus honor 
both the individual’s right to act in accordance with her own moral values and 
the professional obligation to ensure the accessibility of legal services. 
Moreover, such a solution would acknowledge and include all four quadrants, 
in addition to levels and lines, thus making it a truly integral approach to 
resolving a variety of conflicting interests. For the purposes of legal 
professionalism, then, every attorney should be able to say that they support 
and encourage, in a tangible and quantifiable way, the distribution of legal 
services throughout American society. 
The final principle noted above—that lawyers have a continuing 
responsibility to reflect on their interior values and consider these in light of 
their professional role—should also have a place in the discussion of 
professionalism as a component of its UL dimension.170 This includes both 
self-scrutiny as well as feedback through moral dialogue with others, which 
together “help a lawyer to learn from mistakes and to improve professional 
skills generally.”171 At any level of development, professionalism in the UL 
would seem to demand that lawyers pay attention to their personal conscience 
and be able to defend their decisions in accordance with their own interior 
values. 
Drawing on the moral psychology literature, Neil Hamilton defines 
personal conscience as a constellation of elements, including an “awareness of 
 
 170 Importantly, this obligation does not attempt to dictate what those moral values should be, at least to 
the extent that they serve purposes other than upholding the rule of law. Obviously, this assertion comes with a 
caveat. Certain basic moral values like honesty and trustworthiness are necessary for the integrity of the legal 
system. However, these are largely captured by the ethics rules and are in that sense already assumed for the 
purposes of professionalism. What is not assumed, and what should not be dictated by a functional approach to 
professionalism, is the extent to which higher moral principles and behaviors like compassion, empathy, 
altruism, and dedication to selfless service might play a role in an individual’s legal practice. 
 171 Hamilton, supra note 9, at 9. 
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a moral issue, a reasoning process to determine the moral goodness or 
blameworthiness of alternative courses of conduct, and a sense of obligation to 
do what is morally good.”172 This formulation of the UL moral dimension of 
professionalism seems appropriate for a primarily LR-oriented, functional 
approach. That is, it does not prescribe a particular normative set of moral 
values but still emphasizes the need for individuals to engage their moral 
development in the context of their professional lives. In combination with 
ongoing reflection about their professional and societal role, then, this type of 
honest self-reflection would hopefully lead many lawyers to seek out public 
service on their own.173 
IV.  PROFESSIONALISM AS PROCESS 
At the end of this discussion, two general insights stand out. First, 
professionalism is a complicated subject. Defining core values that can apply 
across a diverse profession is a difficult endeavor that leaves much room for 
argument and debate in virtually every dimension. Much of this discussion 
takes place in the abstract, but theoretical clarity is important for defining the 
broad contours of the landscape and can lead to more effective practical 
applications. This Comment is thus intended to contribute to the discussion in 
that regard—to use the Integral framework to add some theoretical structure to 
the often mushy and ambiguous professionalism debate. 
Second, professionalism is dynamic. Society is constantly changing, as is 
culture, as is every individual. The current professionalism crisis has resulted 
from large-scale developments in American society in general, and in the 
practice of law in particular, of which many are irreversible. In this sense, the 
professionalism problem does not lend itself well to a final and permanent 
solution. It is not something to fix so that we can get back to the “real” 
business of law. Perhaps, then, it is better to view the tensions surrounding 
professionalism not as a crisis so much as an inherent symptom of continuing 
social progress—something to be acknowledged, reflected upon, thoughtfully 
 
 172 Id. Hamilton further defines these factors in terms of a “Four-Component Model” for moral 
behavior—consisting of (1) moral sensitivity; (2) moral reasoning and judgment; (3) moral motivation, 
commitment, and professional identity; and (4) moral character and implementation skills—with each 
component being necessary for moral action to take place and each one also capable of independent 
development. Id. at 9–10; Hamilton & Brabbit, supra note 115, at 115–16. In addition, he argues that the 
development of personal conscience through these four components is “synergistic” in its relationship with 
other professional values and that growth in personal conscience itself fosters the development of 
professionalism in a more general sense. Hamilton, supra note 9, at 10. 
 173 Until such a time, however, they can fulfill their professional obligations by paying the fee. 
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managed, and even welcomed as part of the broader evolution of the law and 
society as a whole. In this way, we can contextualize the goal of establishing 
professionalism’s values by emphasizing the inherent value of the search itself. 
As one scholar has observed, it may be that this very act of seeking is 
ultimately more meaningful and important than achieving some tidy end 
result.174 From this perspective, professionalism is not a problem to be solved 
but rather a perpetual process of inquiry and aspiration—one that reforms and 
refines itself with each passing generation. Just as one might argue that 
“lawyering as a profession exists largely because of moral ambiguity, not to 
resolve it,”175 so too might professionalism be characterized not as a desired 
resolution but as an ongoing engagement with the various tensions, 
ambiguities, and conflicts that are inevitably present in the practice of law, and 
indeed in life itself. 
Here, then, it seems equally valid to say of both professionalism and 
lawyering in general that the “work reflects, even at times celebrates, the 
diversity and disagreements characteristic of real life.”176 Each recognizes, in 
the words of Karl Llewellyn, the simple fact that “society is honeycombed with 
disputes,”177 and that the fundamental task of lawyering is to find the most 
reasonable and effective means for dealing with this axiom of human 
existence. However tarnished the image of lawyers might be in today’s world, 
it is undeniable that they serve an essential role in our society. For this reason 
alone, it is worthwhile to seek the highest forms the calling can take.  
As Dane Ciolino writes, “We must acknowledge that professionalism is not 
a destination, but rather, a journey during which we all must critically evaluate 
the effects of our conduct—not just on our clients and on our income—but also 
on our profession, on our society, and on our relationships with one 
another.”178 Such a view offers a way to embrace the professionalism problem 
rather than to lament it. From this perspective, the legal profession is faced not 
with a crisis but with a continuing opportunity to reevaluate itself in the 
context of today’s world, honoring both its long history and tradition as well as 
the inevitability of continuing social and cultural change. To pursue such a 
 
 174 Ciolino, supra note 3, at 239 (“[W]e should come to view ‘professionalism’ as a process and not as a 
place.”). 
 175 Terrell & Wildman, supra note 2, at 407. 
 176 Id. 
 177 LLEWELLYN, supra note 57, at 5 (“Actual disputes call for somebody to do something about 
them. . . . This doing of something about disputes, this doing of it reasonably, is the business of law.”). 
 178 Ciolino, supra note 3, at 239. 
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goal, then, it would seem essential to seek out and utilize the most 
comprehensive, inclusive, and forward-looking theoretical models that we now 
have at our disposal. As this Comment has hopefully demonstrated, Integral 
theory can serve such a function. 
Professionalism-as-process implies that the professionalism problem must 
be accepted as a constant and perpetual element of legal practice. At all times, 
the bar must remain vigilant in ensuring not only that new lawyers are 
adequately instructed in and dedicated to contemporary aspirational values but 
also that the values themselves remain relevant as society and the legal 
profession continue to evolve. This is yet another reason why the Integral 
model can be a useful tool; it provides a content-free framework in which such 
changes can be tracked and understood in multiple dimensions. An Integral 
perspective enables one to focus not only on the values themselves but also on 
the way that those values interact within individuals and society from a 
metaperspective. By tethering the discussion about professionalism to a 
framework outside of the law itself, a stable platform can be created for 
analyzing, interpreting, and making modest normative judgments about what 
sorts of beliefs and behaviors are most appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
As implied by the concept of professionalism-as-process, this is a 
discussion without end. However, an Integral approach can help to facilitate 
the ongoing endeavor to uncover the core values of the legal profession. Again, 
professionalism is a complex issue, requiring a variety of approaches focused 
on a variety of components within the individual, behavioral, social, and 
cultural dimensions. Together this would constitute a truly comprehensive and 
Integral response to the issue, but only when each of these dimensions is 
acknowledged and included within the discussion. The value of an Integral 
perspective, then, lies in orienting these different approaches within the context 
of a larger map so that each one can be assessed for its particular strengths and 
applied where it will be most effective. Such an approach can also help to 
provide a common language of perspectives through which to further evaluate  
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our professional ideals. With that framework in place, our understanding of 
professionalism can continue to evolve in new directions while still honoring 
the traditions of the past. 
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